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INTRODUCTION
Three decades ago Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbit famously
wrote about "tragic choices," namely tough policy choices which offend
deeply held values, and the accompanying "subterfuges," that is,
efforts by policy elites to shield such choices from public view.'
Strangely, the "tragic choice" framework has not been applied in the
context of U.S. immigration law, although current immigration policy
is rife with tragic choices and subterfuges. A case in question is the
issue of commodification of visas. It is clear that U.S. policymakers
remain deeply committed to maintaining an illusion that U.S. visas
are not being "sold."2 For example, in the subprime mortgage financial
GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). The term "subterfuge" is
1.
from Calabresi. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 88 (1985). The
tragic choice framework has most famously been applied to the issue of healthcare rationing. See,

e.g., Leonard Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing:A DemocraticDecisionmakingApproach, 140 U.
PA. L. REv. 1597, 1612 (1992). For example, how do we decide which sick patients receive
expensive liver transplants? Their moral culpability in damaging their current liver, such as
through alcoholism? Their ability to pay for the transplant? Their likelihood of long-term
survival? Their historical or future contribution to society? As far as I can tell, the tragic choice
framework has not typically been applied to the challenges of immigration law and policymaking. An exception is David Martin, Keynote Address, 1981 Friedmann Conference, The
Inter-American Refugee Crisis: In Search of International Legal Solutions, Columbia Law School
(Apr. 3, 1981) (on file with author).
2.
Indeed a recent article in The Economist makes precisely this point. See The Price of
Entry: A New Proposalfrom Gary Becker to Make a Market in Immigration, ECONOMIST, June
26, 2010, at 80, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16424085?storyid=16424085
(noting that Becker's proposal to auction visas, while innovative, has almost no chance of
success, given the background hostility to such ideas). This public posture of elites fits with a
broader public suspicion of selling visas as evidenced by polling, since visas often signify a
potential route to citizenship. See generally the polling data discussed in Shaheen Borna &
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crisis that began in 2007, U.S. policymakers declined to auction visas
to wealthy overseas investors who would be willing to purchase
depressed real estate, a policy suggestion that gained considerable
3
currency as a means of buttressing property values.
Yet, U.S. immigration practice has long made unofficial
concessions to commodification, that is, concessions at the margins.
Notably, the government generally derives no direct benefit from such
concessions, although other parties may extract significant rents. One
might call these "informal subterfuges," as a cottage industry has
developed with labor brokers and coyotes charging applicants high
fees to gain entry to the United States. 4 Strikingly, these fees are
pervasive, not only in the "black" and "gray" markets (that is, markets
outside of the formal economy, sometimes involving inherently illegal
activities such as undocumented border crossings). They are also
pervasive in the "white" markets (within the formal economy). For
example, elite applicants typically employ attorneys and sometimes
lobbyists who charge high fees to navigate the complexities of the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). 5 There are also official
concessions to commodification. Indeed, the INA mandates that some
migrants "pay" very high prices to obtain the right to enter the United
States. Certain elite visa applicants, for example, must invest
significant sums in the U.S. economy as a condition of both obtaining
6
and maintaining their visas.
While in other countries, the poor migrant, like the rich
migrant, may pledge something of value as a condition of receiving her
7
visa, in the United States, the poor migrant has no such option.
James M. Stearns, The Ethics and Efficacy of Selling National Citizenship, 37 J. Bus, ETHICS
193, 196-98 (2002).
3.
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman is the most notable proponent of this
policy. Friedman interviewed Indian elites, who cited the willingness of Indian investors to
invest in foreclosed U.S. properties if immigration benefits would attach to such investments.
Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., The Open-DoorBailout, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A31.
4.
I learned this through an interview with Professor David Spener, whose subjects have
described coyote transportation networks and the exorbitant fees that undocumented migrants
pay to coyotes and brokers. Interview with David Spener, Professor, Trinity Univ. (June 4, 2009).
5.
See, e.g., Evan Perez & Gregory White, FBI Lets Barred Tycoon Visit U.S., WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 30, 2009, at Al (noting that the lobbyist and former Presidential candidate Bob Dole
successfully lobbied for a visa for Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska, who had previously been
barred from the United States due to concerns regarding links to organized crime).
6.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (2006) (providing for visas to be issued to immigrants who
invest at least one million dollars in a start-up U.S. business that generates full-time jobs for ten
United States citizens or lawful residents). For a description of how this works in practice, see
Just Pay the Cover, ECONOMIST, June 25, 2010, http://www.economist.comfblogsfreeexchange
/2010/06/immigration._0.
7.
This is true in rich Asian countries, such as Singapore, and in nearly all of the Middle
Eastern states that rely heavily on migrant workers. See DOVELYN RANNVEIG AGUNIAS &
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Rather, the poor migrant faces another kind of "tragic choice." She
could pay a coyote an astronomical fee to transport her across the
border illegally at great risk to her personal safety, or she could
simply not come. 8 There is a reason for this tragic choice, namely, a
failure of U.S. policymakers to confront a primary challenge of
immigration law: screening these applicants is notoriously difficult
because they typically are not well placed to provide documentary
evidence of credible ties to their country of origin, which will lead
them to return home at the end of their visa's tenure. Typically, the
poor, low-skilled applicant pledges to be law-abiding during her tenure
in the United States, specifically promising to avoid visa overstay. Yet,
the high numbers of visa overstays among migrants generally, and
among poor, low-skilled temporary workers in particular, 9 is evidence
of a quintessential problem of information asymmetry. 10 The typical
KATHLEEN NEWLAND, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., CIRCULAR MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT:
TRENDS, POLY ROUTES, AND WAYS FORWARD 3-8 (2007), available at http:lwww.
migrationpolicy.orgfpubs!MigDevPB_041807.pdf (describing the evolution of circular migration
and migrants as "active agents of their own mobility"); ORN BODVARSSON & HENDRIK VAN DEN
BERG, TEMPORARY MIGRATION, INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION, AND OTHER VARIATIONS ON THE
STANDARD MODEL 261-84 (2009) (describing variations on the standard immigration model).
8.
Given the limited number of guest-worker visas, a low-skilled person without ties to
family in the United States to "sponsor" them has no practical mechanism of entry. There are
strict numerical limits on the number of guest workers. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2006) (guestworker provisions). For a candid acknowledgement of the fact that the numerical limits on guest
workers make it virtually impossible for low-skilled persons to come, see Press Release, The
White House, President Signs Homeland Security Appropriation Act for 2006 (Oct. 18, 2005),
available at http://georgewbush.whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/1O/20051018-2.
html.
9.
Nearly half of the undocumented population of twelve million overstayed their visas.
See Ted Robbins, All Things Considered: Nearly Half of Illegal Immigrants Overstay Visa (NPR
radio broadcast July 14, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5485917.
Moreover, the United States is unable to trace most persons who overstay their visas. See James
C. McKinley & Julia Preston, U.S. Can't Trace Foreign Visitors on Expired Visas, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2009, at Al (noting that over forty percent of the undocumented migrants were
previously documented and overstayed). Although overstay rates among guest workers are lower
now than they were in the past, historically, high overstay rates among guest workers were a
primary contributor to the size of the undocumented population. Philip L. Martin & Michael S.
Teitelbaum, The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 117. The
size of the undocumented population (of twelve million) is taken from the work of Douglas
Massey, a sociologist and leading authority on this issue. See Douglas S. Massey, Borderline
Madness: America's Counterproductive Immigration Policy, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129-38
(Carol Swain ed., 2008). Other estimates generally indicate that there are between ten and
fourteen million undocumented persons. See DAVID A. MARTIN, MIGRATION POLY INST.,
TWILIGHT STATUSES: A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION 1 (2005),
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubsfMPIPB_6.05.pdf; JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW
HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS 3 (2005), available
at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.
10. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59
STAN. L. REV. 809, 824-27 (2007) (pointing out the difficulties of information asymmetry); see
also HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION &
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applicant knows much more about whether she will return to her
home country than the U.S. government, while the government
typically has no way of evaluating the sincerity of her commitments.
To overcome this challenge, this Article recommends what economists
popularly term "hostage taking"-requiring that a visa applicant post
bond."l
While a bonding proposal initially may seem radical, bonding
has a long heritage in many aspects of the common law and appears to
have been utilized heavily by the states early in U.S. history. 12
Moreover, the U.S. government already is heavily involved with
bonding regimes on its overseas military bases, albeit indirectly.
Immigration authorities in the Middle East typically require guest
workers to post bonds. In keeping with these requirements,
Halliburton, the military contractor, fills many of the housekeeping
positions on U.S. military bases in the Gulf by posting bonds for guest
workers. 13 Yet despite the obvious applicability of bonding to U.S
immigration challenges in a modern globalized world in which people

CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 15-37 (2006) (pointing out a further difficulty that even a
sincere visa applicant who promises to return to his home country may change his mind once he
has been in the United States for a period of time).
11. The term "hostage taking" comes from the economics literature. See generally Oliver E.
Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
519 (1983). In this particular context, the pejorative term "hostage" refers to a government's
ability to hold hostage something of value to the alien until he exits the country.
12. See, e.g., GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 25-30, 39, 48, 146-47 (1996) (discussing several examples of bonding in
early attempts to regulate the movement of persons, including a colonial system of demanding
security from masters of vessels for immigrants deemed likely to become paupers, which was
later adopted in Massachusetts and other states in several iterations of statutes requiring bonds
from vessels to indemnify the state for expenses arising from any passenger who lacked a
settlement in the state and would likely become a public charge). Notably, some of these bonding
systems were invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court and state courts as impermissible attempts
by the states to regulate foreign and interstate commerce in the absence of federal laws and
treaties, but sometimes even after invalidation these bonding systems reappeared in other forms.
See generally Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1833 (1993) (discussing bonding in early U.S. history). For a discussion of bonding in other
contexts, including some historical discussion, see generally THE LAW OF MISCELLANEOUS AND
COMMERCIAL SURETY BONDS (Todd C. Kazlow & Bruce C. King eds., 2001) (leading text on
bonding in the commercial context); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence
on Public Versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. & ECON. 93, 118 (2004)
(discussing the effectiveness of bail bonding systems in diverse contexts); Bail, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN.
REV. CRIM. PROc. 311 (2008) (summary of the current law on bail bonding in the criminal law
context).
13. Halliburton typically hires South Asians for these positions. Nizar Latif, IraqisAngry at
Loss of Jobs to Asians, NATIONAL (Abu Dhabi), Nov. 8, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/apps
pbcs.dlllarticle?AID=/20091108/FOREIGN/711079862/1135.
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move more easily than in previous times,' 4 it is curious that there has
been little discussion of broader bonding proposals. 15 This Article is an
effort to begin that dialogue.
Admittedly, there are problems with bonding regimes in the
U.S. context, which justify the utilization of the "tragic choice"
metaphor. In a country resolutely committed by its historical Ellis
Island metaphors to the notion that it opens its borders to deserving
migrants, 16 regardless of their socioeconomic status, bonding systems
may create a view that visas are being "sold." However, immigration
law already routinely uses market-based mechanisms to screen rich
migrants. The question becomes: Why should poor migrants not have
similar opportunities? The real issue is not the bonding requirement,
but rather the absence of opportunities in developing countries for
poor people to access credit facilities to finance bonds.
While proposals for visa bonding of guest workers are rarely
discussed, skeptics more generally cite the justice concerns associated
with any proposal that fails to address the extreme inequities in life
prospects that necessarily underlie any migrant's willingness to bond
herself. 17 Then there is the Dickensian free-for-all that preceded
modern immigration law: In the early days of the American Republic,
employers bonded fully half of white migrants as a condition of their
passage with the implicit cooperation of the government, which
enforced the bonds. Upon arrival, migrants labored to pay off bonds in
14. Indeed, bonding is currently utilized in limited circumstances in the INA.
INA § 212(d)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) (2006) ('The Attorney General shall prescribe
conditions, including the exaction of such bonds as may be necessary, to control and regulate the
admission and return of inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission under this
paragraph."); § 213 (regarding admission of aliens upon giving bond or undertaking and its
return upon permanent departure); § 214 ('The admission to the United States of any alien as a
nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by
regulations prescribe, including when he deems necessary the giving of a bond with sufficient
surety in such sum and containing such conditions as the Attorney General shall
prescribe .... "); see also THOMAS ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY 748 (6th ed. 2008); STEPHEN LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 651, 818 (5th ed. 2009).
15. The exceptions are Jeffrey Manms and Peter Schuck. Manns's exploration of the role of
gatekeepers in immigration enforcement includes a brief discussion of bonding. Jeffrey Maims,

Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
887, 889-90. Peter Schuck also briefly discusses bonding. Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and

Removal: A "White Paper" 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 682-85 (1997).
16. See ARISTIDE ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING
OF AMERICA 1-24 (2006) (detailing the evolution of this Ellis Island metaphor of the "deserving
migrant").
17. Ayelet Shachar is a skeptic. See AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY:
CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 22 (2009) ("[T]he greater promise lies in diminishing the
extreme inequities in life prospects that are presently attached to ascribed membership status
under the existing birthright regime.").
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slave-like conditions; in contemporary times, bonded workers in the
Gulf have been described as indentured servants.' 8 Yet these concerns
seem strangely out of place in the modern United States, where bonds
are enforceable with appropriate human rights protections. Moreover,
critics face an undeniable irony: the average migrant worker sees the
value of her labor increase more than four-fold in the United States. 19
By lowering overstays, bonding systems may improve U.S. labor
market access for poor migrants whose welfare motivates distributive
justice critiques in the first place. 20 Thus, the goal should be to pursue
transparent bonding proposals, while mitigating distributive justice
concerns. One solution would be to provide incentives for employers to
finance bonds. However, there will always be worthy applicants who
cannot find employers that will post bonds on their behalves. 21 Thus,
22
applicants should be able to finance bonds on their own initiative.

18. See ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY!: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 47-48 (2005) (discussing
early white migrants); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SWEPT UNDER THE RUG: ABUSES AGAINST
DOMESTIC WORKERS AROUND THE WORLD (2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/erd
reports/2006/07/27/swept-under-rug-0 (discussing the working conditions of bonded workers in
the Middle East). Although indentured laborers often worked under difficult conditions,
indentured servitude was distinct, of course, from slavery. Foner's text famously elucidates the
distinction between the two institutions. In modern times, the distributive justice questions have
particular resonance given that poor bonded migrants are disproportionately likely to be racial
minorities. This is certainly the case in the Middle East where bonded migrants are comprised
almost entirely of South Asians. Critics have raised the prospect of a separate underclass of poor
migrants. In the U.S. context, although bonding regimes are not yet widely utilized, this concern
of a separate underclass has particular resonance and is raised in several law review articles,
especially in the context of guest-worker programs. For skeptical discussions of guest-worker
programs more generally, see MOTOMURA, supra note 10, at 15-37. For more targeted critiques
of guest-worker programs, see Jennifer Gordon, TransnationalLabor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L.
REV. 503 (2007) (discussing the concept of 'labor citizenship'); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest
Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One
Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219 (arguing that a guest-worker program will neither solve
illegal immigration nor labor woes, and that it will create further resistance on the part of guest
workers to integrating into the U.S.).
19. See Michael Clemens et al., The Place Premium: Wage Differences for Identical Workers
Across the U.S. Border (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 55, 2008), available at
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/16352 (discussing the "place premium," namely
the wage gain accruing to foreign workers who arrive in the United States and finding that
migration has a much more immediate impact on poverty alleviation than any other policy since
the wage differentials between the United States and most developing countries are so great).
20. Indeed, bonding proposals have recently gained currency in Britain for precisely this
reason. For example, South Asian lobby groups have advocated bonding proposals on the
grounds that it would improve access for South Asians to Britain. Jenny Booth, Britons Face Jail
if Relatives Overstay Their Visa, TIMES ONLINE (London), June 25, 2008, http:1/www.timesonline.
co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4211653.ece.
21. See, e.g., MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION & WELFARE, NATIONAL
LABOR MIGRATION POLICY FOR SRI LANKA, at v (2008) (Sri Lanka), available at http://www.
ilo.org/publicenglish/protection/migrantdownload/mpolicy-srilankaen.pdf
(promoting
minimum requirements for migrant workers seeking particular jobs). This finding justifies the
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As recent history in developed countries' markets has shown,
23
the road to extending credit to the poor is rife with potential pitfalls.
Indeed, the current state of credit markets for poor people in the
developing world is not unlike the market that existed here in the
United States before protections for poor borrowers proliferated at the
federal and state levels. 24 Although it may not be widely recognized
25
outside of specialist circles, the poor have long been able to borrow.
In each of the depressions in U.S. economic history, there has been a
thriving market of money lenders. 26 The problem is that the poor's
financiers typically operate in the black market, extracting terms that
are unjustifiable in a modern market economy. Money lenders have
long been understood to demand onerous terms; one need only
consider the biblical condemnation of the abuses of money lenders in
27
Jerusalem's temple.

emphasis on institutional innovations that allow guest workers to finance their own bonds
independent of finding willing employers.
22. This distributive justice intuition-namely enhancing access to visas-is supported by
the work of a number of leading political theorists. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. CARENS, CULTURE,
CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION OF JUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS
1-20 (2000) (criticizing "efforts at political domination and exclusion" justified by some scholars);
Randall Hanson & Patrick Weil, Introduction: Dual Citizenship in a Changed World:
Immigration, Gender, and Social Rights, in DUAL NATIONALITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL
CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE: THE REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP 1, 7-11 (Randall
Hansen & Patrick Wel eds., 2002) [hereinafter DUAL NATIONALITY] (noting the arguments for
and against dual citizenship and suggesting that the measurable and hypothesized benefits
outweigh the relatively weak case against); Louis Michael Seidman, Fear and Loathing at the
Border, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 136, 140-45 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995) (concluding that
"a regime of liberalized immigration probably constitutes the best solution to resource
maldistribution in our actual world of bounded caring"); James Woodward, Commentary:
Liberalism and Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL
MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 59, 82 (Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992) (noting
that affluent countries "should adopt a policy of open borders" and that a contrary conclusion is
inconsistent with 'liberal egalitarian values").
23. Michael Barr and Rebecca Blank's introductory chapter to their new volume makes this
point particularly well. Michael S. Barr & Rebecca M. Blank, Savings, Assets, Credit, and
Banking Among Low-Income Households: Introduction and Overview, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS:
SAVINGS, ASSETS, CREDIT, AND BANKING AMONG LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 1, 1-18 (Michael S.
Barr & Rebecca M. Blank eds., 2009) [hereinafter INSUFFICIENT FUNDS].
24. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY,
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY 1607-1900, at 6-15 (1974) (describing colonial
debtor-creditor relations).
25. Jill Lepore, Annals of Finance: "I.O.U.," NEW YORKER, Apr. 13, 2009, at 34 ("Debtors'
prison was abolished, and bankruptcy law was liberalized, because Americans came to see that
most people who fall into debt are victims of the business cycle, and not of fate or divine
retribution.").
26. See COLEMAN, supra note 24, at 16-30 (noting the existence of black markets during
various nineteenth-century depressions and the accompanying bankruptcy reforms).
27. Matthew 21:12 (detailing Jesus' criticisms of money lenders in the temple).
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These abuses have continued in modern times. For example,
South Asian guest workers who post bonds to work in the Middle East
often finance their bonds by executing loan contracts with local money
lenders. These money lenders may enforce contracts with implicit
threats of violence. 28 Their threats are credible. Indeed, Nepalese
farmers borrow money for fertilizer by sometimes pledging their
daughters as "collateral." The daughters then work as indentured
laborers to the money lenders until the loan is paid off.29 The same
Nepalese farmer may need a loan to underwrite a bond for a work visa
in Dubai, where he can increase his earnings several-fold. While it
would be tragic to deny him this opportunity, in the absence of access
to credit in a transparent, regulated setting, he may find himself
making a similarly tragic choice that involves pledging his daughter.
This is the world as it currently is for the poor of developing
countries who seek financing. This Article is an attempt to map a
trajectory to a world as it could be. Our distributive justice
commitments counsel providing enhanced access to visas through
readily available financing. Simultaneously, we must set a certain
threshold of protections that should exist for a proposal to be
acceptable; at a minimum, financing for poor migrants must be
obtained in a law-bound context.30 One could hardly be comfortable
with migrants financing the bonds that underlie their visas to the
United States in the black market, with a shadowy world of money
lenders and coyotes extending loans. Unfortunately, this is precisely

28.

See generally DARYL COLLINS ET AL., PORTFOLIOS OF THE POOR: HOW THE WORLD'S POOR

LIVE ON $2 A DAY (2009) (addressing the "fundamental question" of how the world's "poor make
ends meet").
29. The Nepal Youth Foundation-an associate of Ashoka, the global association of social
entrepreneurs-has widely publicized the plight of Nepalese girls who are pledged to money
lenders as indentured servants. See Posting of Jake R., Trailblazersfor Good: Freeing Enslaved
Girls in Nepal, CARE2 (July 18, 2010), http://www.care2.com/causes/trailblazers/blog/-100-buysfreedom-for-an-enslaved-girl-in-nepal/.
30. Of course, even when financing occurs in the context of a law-bound framework, a range
of problems may occur, as the recent global financial crisis has reminded us. If the experience of
student borrowers and poor, subprime borrowers in the United States is any guide, prospective
guest workers could be particularly susceptible to predatory lending practices. This reinforces
the need for vigorous regulation of lenders. For a summary of the issues in this regard, see
generally NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PILING IT ON: THE GROWTH OF PROPRIETARY SCHOOL
LOANS AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR STUDENTS (2011), available at http://www.
studentloanborrowerassistance.orgblogs/wp-content/www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/
uploadsfFile/proprietary-schools-loans.pdf (summarizing predatory lending practices and their
consequences for students); ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING
GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS (2006),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lendingresearch-analysis/foreclosurepaper-report-2-17.pdf (summarizing extensive predatory lending practices, particularly among
low income U.S. residents).
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what transpires now. Although there is little in the legal scholarship 3'
on either secured or unsecured lending at the "bottom of the pyramid"
in developing countries, 32 a realistic assessment of the current state of
lending to the poor confirms that the prospects for formal financial
institutions extending credit are not promising. Given that cash
diversion is a particular risk in the informal economies that are
typically pervasive in developing countries, formal financial
institutions generally follow the maxim, "no collateral, no loan."3 For
the poor, this has generally resulted in "no loan."34 Moreover, the legal
systems in many developing countries do not reliably enforce loan
contracts. This only exacerbates the difficulties of formal financial
intermediation for the poor. How, then, can bankers in the developing
world be incentivized to finance visa bonds in the formal sector? To
31. Michael Barr and Ronald Mann's work on financial services for low-income U.S.
residents is a model of the type of work that would be helpful on financial services for the poor of
developing countries. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Financial Services, Saving, and Borrowing
Among Low- and Moderate-Income Households: Evidence from the Detroit Area Household
Financial Services Survey, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS, supra note 23, ch. 3; Ronald J. Mann,
Patterns of Credit Card Use Among Low- and Moderate-Income Households, in INSUFFICIENT
FUNDS, supra note 23, ch. 9. However, there is minimal work in the legal scholarship on lending
to the poor in the developing world. An exception is Hal S. Scott, The State of Banking in
Developing Countries, in ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW: PAPERS
FROM THE FOURTH BIANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMMERCIAL

AND CONSUMER LAW 87, 87-105 (Donald B. King ed., 1992), which includes a brief discussion on
the issue.
32. The term "bottom of the pyramid" was first used by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in
one of his famous fireside chats during the Great Depression. It has gained currency among
development economists who study poverty in the developing world. See generally STUART HART,
CAPITALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: THE UNLIMITED BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN SOLVING THE
WORLD'S MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS (2005) (popularizing the term and advocating market-based
solutions to poverty); C.K. PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID:
ERADICATING POVERTY THROUGH PROFITS (2006) (same). But see Aneel Karnani, The Mirage of
Marketing to the Bottom of the Pyramid: How the Private Sector Can Help Alleviate Poverty, 49
CAL. MGMT. J. 90, 111 (2007) (pointing out the deficiencies of the term).
33. In this particular instance, I utilize the term "collateral" in its traditional sense, namely
as property that is pledged as security against a debt. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (8th ed.
2004). "Security" is "[c]ollateral given or pledged to guarantee the fulfillment of an obligation;
especially, the assurance that a creditor will be repaid . . . any money or credit extended to a
debtor." Id. at 1384. Generally, I will use the terms security and collateral interchangeably in
this Article. Of course, the utilization of the term "collateral" in the phrase "visa as collateral" is
metaphorical rather than literal. The visa is not collateral in the traditional sense that it is
something of value pledged to the lender that can be enforced against it in the event of default on
a loan. The visa cannot be possessed by the lender. Instead, the loan is "secured" by the value of
the visa license to the borrower, the promise of the government to revoke the visa if the borrower
defaults, and the possibility that the lender may recoup some of the loan proceeds-even in the
event that the borrower defaults-if the lender aids in the process of finding the noncompliant
alien.
34. Phillip Bond & Ashok Rai, Collateral Substitutes in Microfinance 1 (July 3, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/develop/tdw02/rai021118.pdf.
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address this question, I conducted a qualitative field study of guest
workers and their bankers.
The key move is to mitigate the inability of bankers to enforce
contracts"-loan
what this Article terms "loan-for-visa-bond
agreements underlying the financing that migrants will use to pay
their bonds to obtain visas. This can be accomplished by making loan
compliance a condition of visa renewal. That is, the U.S. government
will commit to bankers that it will only renew a visa if an applicant is
properly servicing the loan that underlies the bond associated with the
visa. In exchange, the bank will commit to thoroughly evaluating the
applicant's risk profile as a condition of extending the loan. In so
doing, the proposal seriously mitigates the challenges for bankers of
enforcing loan contracts, while simultaneously alleviating the
challenges for the U.S. government of evaluating the risk profiles of
potential migrants. Notably, these visas would be modeled 35 on other
government licenses that function as collateral-like devices. 36 In the
world as it could be, labor mobility would be bankable in the formal
sector.
How would the proposal work in practice? While the proposal
clearly has broader applicability, I am concerned here primarily with
guest-worker visas. The guest-worker provisions of the INA would be
revised to codify a punitive bond arrangement that will increase the
cost of a breach for a visa recipient who overstays. The reader might
quite reasonably ask what precisely this proposal is bonding against.
If we are asking the United States to put its "seal of approval" on
private bond enforcement, then the content of the bond matters. It
bears emphasis: the primary point of this proposal is not to ensure
that the guest worker abides by his work contract or does not become
a public charge (although these may be additional benefits). Rather,
the point is to ensure that the worker leaves the country when she
commits to do so.
In the new system, the visa officer in the local embassy would
retain her critical role as a primary gatekeeper, but this role would be
35. The term is Blocher's play on Reich's famous term "the new property." See Joseph
Blocher, Reputation as Property in Virtual Economies, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 120 (2009);
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see also infra Section II.H (titled
"Visas as New 'New Property' ").
36. Taxicab medallions, for example, are among the licenses that are routinely used in
secured transactions. See, e.g., Katrina M. Wyman, Is Bentham Right?: The Case of New York
City Taxicab Medallions 3-4 (Dec. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
("[Taxi medallions] have become valuable assets that are routinely bought and sold by
individuals and firms for hundreds of thousands of dollars a piece, accepted by publicly traded
companies as collateral for loans, and leased by medallion owners to the mainly immigrant
drivers who actually provide taxi service in the City.').

20111

VISA AS PROPERTY

1059

supplemented by a bank acting as a secondary gatekeeper. To this
end, rather than issuing a visa, the visa officer would issue the
prospective visa recipient a provisional "visa license." This visa license
would signify conditional approval, contingent on a demonstrated
ability to post a bond. The prospective visa recipient would then
present her conditional visa license to a bank as part of her loan
application. By providing only conditional approval, the United States
would be seeking further assurance from the bank that the
prospective visa recipient has a good risk profile. In the event that the
guest worker later defaults (on her loan or on the terms of her visa),
putting the bond at risk, the bank will be properly motivated to find
the defaulting guest worker. The amount of the bond that is recouped
will be indexed to how quickly the bank is able to provide evidence
that the noncompliant alien has exited the United States; the bank or
its agent will have incentives to either "snitch" or encourage the alien
to self-deport.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I critiques the current
approach of U.S. immigration law to screening guest workers and lays
out the bonding proposal. Part II discusses the crux of the problemmotivating third parties to finance visa bonds. Crucially, if
appropriately designed, these visas will constitute the ideal type of
collateral-like device, in that they will be highly valuable to the
borrower but less valuable to the lender. Part III further elucidates
why visa-as-collateral would work. Legal systems in developing
countries often have no credibility with their banking sectors;
therefore, banks make deals, that is, specific accommodations for
individual borrowers, rather than relying on rules.3 7 In contrast, the
U.S. government is considered a credible threat-maker. Banks will not
have to make deals because they will be secure in the knowledge that
the United States will enforce the rules and refuse to renew a visa in
the event of a visa-bond loan default. Part IV focuses on a primary
advantage of the proposal, namely the outsourcing of both the
screening and enforcement function to bankers. The Conclusion
addresses the concern that visa-as-collateral constitutes an unseemly
concession to commodification 38 since market-based mechanisms of

37. I am indebted to Lant Pritchett for pointing this out to me. See generally Mary
Hallward-Driemeier, et al., Deals Versus Rules: Policy Implementation Uncertainty and Why
Firms Hate It (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16001, 2010) (discussing how
unstable legal regimes lead firms to make policy decisions based on "deals" rather than "rules,"
and how this leads to policy uncertainty).
38. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 2-6 (1996) (offering a critique of
"universal commodification," namely the tendency to judge everything that we value according to
the willingness of individuals to pay for it in the marketplace).
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allocation are considered inappropriate in distributing certain quasipublic goods. 39 This is a classic instance of what I term "facilitative
commodification," with the classic trade-offs of proposals that seek to
improve the opportunity sets of the poor, while simultaneously
improving compliance. This proposal betters the legal landscape for
immigration by reducing "subterfuges" and rendering the choices
made somewhat less "tragic," particularly for the poor.
I. IMPROVING SCREENING: BONDING AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID

A. DisproportionateEmphasis on Due Diligence and Assurances
Consider the following fact pattern regularly encountered by a
Kuwaiti immigration officer: A South Asian worker submits an
application for a temporary guest-worker visa that would allow her to
take a housekeeping position on a U.S. military base. The Kuwaiti
immigration officer is concerned about two potential difficulties with
the application. First, the prospective migrant may overstay her visa.
Second, the applicant may impose welfare costs on the state.
Kuwait regularly requires that a bond be posted with the
Kuwaiti government as a condition of entry for guest workers.
Notably, the bond will be forfeited if the guest worker fails to meet any
one of three conditions: (1) providing accurate information about
historical behavior, that is, her record of law abidance; (2) abiding by
the visa terms, including a requirement that she not impose welfare
costs on the Kuwaiti government; and (3) exiting Kuwait in the
prescribed time period. 40 Since the U.S. military employs contractors
39. I recognize that I am utilizing the term "public good" in an unconventional sense in
describing visas, and I am borrowing this utilization from RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION:
CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005)
[hereinafter RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION]. See generally Martha M. Ertman & Joan C.
Williams, Preface to RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra, at 1, 1-7; Margaret Jane Radin &

Madhavi Sunder, Introduction: The Subject and Object of Commodification, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION, supra, at 8, 8-29.

40. Typically, the amount that South Asian guest workers pay in relation to their earning
power in their countries of origin are astronomical. For example, the average bond is often
equivalent to the annual salary of the average Sri Lankan worker. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
EXPORTED AND EXPOSED: ABUSES AGAINST SRI LANKAN DOMESTIC WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA,
KUWAIT, LEBANON, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 22-23 (2007) (noting that bonds are

typically prohibitive for the average Sri Lankan in relation to their purchasing power parity).
The purchasing power parity ('PPP") of an average citizen in Sri Lanka is US $4,720. PPP is
often utilized by development economists to reflect the real purchasing power of an average
citizen in relation to a standardized basket of goods (such as food and shelter). See WORLD BANK,
GROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA 2009, ATLAS METHOD AND PPP (2010), available at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf. The average bond
appears to exceed the amount needed to deter noncompliance; it may include excess (and
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who utilize guest workers in Kuwait, the U.S. government is regularly
41
involved with such bonding arrangements, albeit often indirectly.
Now consider a U.S. immigration officer facing a similar fact
pattern: The applicant for a temporary guest-worker visa begs for
favorable consideration, seeking to distinguish herself from similarly
42
situated applicants who have been noncompliant in the past.

perhaps illicit) rents for labor brokers and government officials. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra,at 23.
41. Even though the U.S. government typically does not post the bond, it usually retains a
contractor, such as Halliburton, who in turn retains a labor broker who posts the bond or ensures
that such bond is posted by the South Asian guest worker. Given that the guest worker is
typically without access to credit, she generally borrows this money from the labor broker who
arranges her visa and her job. She signs a contract under which her salary is paid to the labor
broker until the load is repaid. It appears that the implicit interest rate is very high. Interview
with Dr. Nasra Shah, Faculty of Community Medicine and Behavioral Sciences, Univ. of Kuwait
(May 19, 2010).
42. The reader should be aware that the guest-worker visas discussed in this Article raise
profound questions of justice, which are beyond the scope of this Article and should be the
subject of a later work. There is an ongoing and well-documented tension between the state's
interest in the provision of low-cost labor and its concern with the protection of human rights
more generally. These concerns include but are not limited to the following: (1) whether the
presence of a large-scale population of temporary guests institutionalizes the exclusion of
noncitizens from the constitutional mainstream, undermines political community, and
denigrates the value of citizenship; (2) whether these programs undermine wages and workplace
protections for both guests and native workers; and (3) whether such programs legitimize the
application of a broader "trade paradigm" to human beings that commodities labor. I am fully
cognizant of these concerns, which provide fertile ground for further work. The following is a
partial list of references that address these concerns: CARENS, supra note 22, at 107-22 (2000)
(discussing the difficult moral questions that arise in the context of immigrants assimilating into
a liberal society's culture); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
AND EQUALITY 56-61 (1983) (opposing guest-worker programs on the grounds that they do not
conform to the liberal egalitarian principles that govern full membership in a just state); Joseph
H. Carens, Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Immigration: False Dichotomies and Shifting
Presuppositions,in CANADIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 17, 18 (Ronald Beiner & Wayne Norman
eds., 2001) (analyzing the conflict between immigrants' moral claims and citizens' moral claims,
and attempting to reconcile them); Michael Jones Correa, Seeking Shelter: Immigrants and the
Divergence of Social Rights and Citizenship in the United States, in DUAL NATIONALITY, supra
note 22, at 233, 234 (examining the dichotomy between citizen and immigrant social rights in the
context of the argument for postnational citizenship); Seidman, supra note 22, at 140 (arguing
that it is impossible to wholly reconcile our universal obligation to others with our desire to care
more specially for those in our community); Woodward, supra note 22, at 82 (arguing that it is
often in wealthy societies' best interest to allow even illegal immigration, but that it is
fundamentally incompatible with liberal egalitarian values to treat immigrants as second-class
citizens once they arrive). For discussions of the impact of low-skilled alien workers on wages of
citizen workers, see GEORGE J.BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON
THE U.S. ECONOMY 81, 86-88 (1990) (presenting empirical evidence to show that immigration has
no sizeable adverse affect on the earnings of the general population, but does have an adverse
impact on the earnings of native unskilled workers); MOTOMURA, supra note 10, at 48 (discussing
how the working class has historically viewed immigrants as competition for employment);
Gordon, supra note 18, at 505 ("Historically, unions have been restrictionist in their approach to
immigration, but today most unions in the United States welcome immigrants already present in
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Although rarely articulated in this manner, U.S. immigration law
generally addresses this challenge by utilizing a two-fold strategy that
resembles Anglo-American contract law.
First, in an effort to deal with the challenges of obtaining
reliable information concerning the applicant's historical behavior,
U.S. immigration officials conduct "due diligence." A web of laws allow
the government to ascertain historical and likely future behavior of
any visa applicant, including prospective guest workers (by
mandating, for example, in certain instances that the applicant
provide evidence of past good behavior, such as police reports, as well
as evidence of likely good behavior in the future, such as assets in the
home country to which the visa applicant is likely to return).43 Second,
it also asks the applicant to give assurances that the information
provided is accurate. 44 In the event that the information shared by the
the industries they organize, including the undocumented."); Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 249
(recognizing the "fickleness" of U.S. attitudes towards immigrants).
43. See, e.g., INA § 214(a)(1) ('"The admission to the United States of any alien as a
nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by
regulations prescribe ... to insure that at the expiration of such time or upon failure to maintain
the status under which he was admitted, or to maintain any status subsequently acquired under
section 248, such alien will depart from the United States."); § 214(b) ("Every alien ... (other
than a nonimmigrant described in subparagraph (L) or (V) of section 101(a)(15), and other than a
nonimmigrant described in any provision of section 101(a)(15)(H)(i) except subclause (bi) of such
section) shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the
consular officer, at the time of application for a visa, and the immigration officers, at the time of
application for admission, that he is entitled to a nonimmigrant status under section
101(a)(15)."); § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (defining a particular class of "nonimmigrant aliens" as
someone "having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is
coming temporarily to the United States to perform agricultural labor or services, as defined by
the Secretary of Labor in regulations and including agricultural labor defined in section 3121(g)
of... the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, agriculture as defined in section 3(f) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203(f)), and the pressing of apples for cider on a farm, of a
temporary or seasonal nature..."). Although the guidance from the State Department's Bureau
of Consular Affairs does not appear to contain a specific reference to guest-worker visas, the
reference to the obligations placed on other temporary admittees may serve as a guide. See, e.g.,
Visitor Visas-Business and Pleasure U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/visa
temp/types/types_1262.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) ('The presumption in the law is that every
visitor visa applicant is an intending immigrant. Therefore, applicants for visitor visas must
overcome this presumption by demonstrating that: The purpose of their trip is to enter the U.S.
for business, pleasure, or medical treatment; That they plan to remain for a specific, limited
period; Evidence of funds to cover expenses in the United States; Evidence of compelling social
and economic ties abroad; and [tihat they have a residence outside the U.S. as well as other
binding ties that will insure their return abroad at the end of the visit.").
44. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Nonimmigrant Visa Application DS-156, available at
https:levisaforms.state.govlds156.asp ("41. I certify that I have read and understood all the
questions set forth in this application and the answers I have furnished on this form are true and
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that any false or misleading
statement may result in the permanent refusal of a visa or denial of entry into the United States.
I understand that possession of a visa does not automatically entitle the bearer to enter the
United States of America upon arrival at a port of entry if he or she is found inadmissible.").
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migrant in the due diligence process turns out later to be false, the
penalty is usually visa revocation. 45 However, given the high numbers
of temporary visitors who overstay, 46 it is apparent that the
traditional emphasis on due diligence and assurances and the threat
of visa revocation in the face of false statements have not been
effective.
B. PotentialSolution: The Kuwaiti Approach
The economics literature provides an obvious solution to
problems of information asymmetry-the Kuwaiti answer, 47 which
requires prospective migrants to post bonds. 48 There are two distinct
situations in which the gatekeeper is likely to be at an informational
disadvantage. The first situation involves historical facts concerning
the past behavior of the applicant; for example, whether the applicant
has complied with laws or imposed welfare costs on the state in the
past. The second situation involves predicting the applicant's future
behavior. Specifically, will she abide by the terms of her visa, exiting
by the prescribed date and not imposing welfare costs on the
government in the interim?

45. See supra note 43 (discussing possibility of visa revocation).
46. McKinley & Preston, supra note 9.
47. Going forward, I will refer to the party with lesser information, who is assessing the
reliability of such information, as the "gatekeeper," and the party with better information, who
seeks to convince the gatekeeper of her trustworthiness, as the "applicant." In the Kuwaiti fact
pattern, if the U.S. military employer posts the bond itself, the Kuwaiti government has
essentially outsourced the gatekeeping function to the U.S. military. However, the U.S. military
is likely to subcontract this function to a labor/bond broker (that is, a private company which
refers workers and assumes the bond-posting responsibility), and in so doing, outsource the
gatekeeping function to the labor/bond broker.
48. For a good high-level introduction to the role of bonds, see David Charny, Nonlegal
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 375 (1990). Charny discusses
two other types of nonlegal sanctions, including reputational sanctions and the loss of psychic
goods such as self-esteem. Id. at 393. In a previous paper, I discussed both these typologies of
nonlegal sanctions in the context of immigration. See Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown,
OutsourcingImmigration Compliance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475, 2482 (2009).
Another good summary of the use of bonds in resolving the problems of information
asymmetry is Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions,87 GEO. L.J.
2225, 2229 (1999). Jeffrey Manns briefly discusses the potential advantages of bonds in the
immigration context. Manns, supra note 15, at 892-93. For discussions of bonding in the context
of gatekeeping, see Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 955
(1998); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers:The Anatomy of a Third-PartyEnforcement Strategy,
2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986). Papers discussing economic models of bonding arrangements
include Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing
Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27, 43 (1980); Williamson, supra note 11, at 519.
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In the ensuing analysis, I distinguish between information
about historical behavior and information predictive of future
behavior. Why distinguish between the two? In one sense, they are
inextricably intertwined-the historical behavior of a visa applicant
may well predict future behavior (indeed, one could imagine making
this case statistically). However, the applicant's past behavior can be
differentiated from her future behavior because future commitments
necessarily involve moral hazard.
In light of this, ideally, any device that seeks to mitigate the
challenges of information asymmetry will not only increase the
applicant's incentive to be honest about past behavior (since the
applicant will have reason to believe that lies will be caught by the
gatekeeper), but will also continuously motivate the applicant to abide
by her visa terms in the future. Notably, the foregoing Kuwaiti
bonding arrangement accomplishes both of these goals. The bond may
be forfeited either in the event that the guest worker is found to have
lied about historical behavior, or in the event that she does not comply
with the conditions of her visa in the future. In both cases, deportation
ensues. In the United States, unlike in Kuwait, there is no ongoing
mechanism for motivating future compliance other than the threat of
visa revocation and subsequent deportation (which lacks credibility,
particularly if the likelihood of deportation is low as a practical
matter).
C. Designinga Bond
Let us take a moment to consider the ideal characteristics of a
bond. A bond should be designed asymmetrically so that if the
gatekeeper executes on the bond, the visa recipient would suffer a
49
significant loss even as the gatekeeper realizes an insignificant gain.
49. The ideal "hostage" should constrain the visa recipient but not tempt the gatekeeper.
The concept is often captured in the metaphor of the "ugly princess" whose father offers her as a
bond to the king of a warring kingdom as evidence of his intention to abide by a peace treaty.
Given familial ties, she is much more valuable to her father than she is to the other king. See
Williamson, supra note 11, at 526-27 (discussing the hostage model in the context of unilateral
and bilateral exchange). The ugly princess has since been updated to the "puny prince." See
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing,86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 930 (1986)
("Yet the concomitant risk that the creditor monarch will provoke a default and make off with
the hostage is similarly reduced since the puny prince has little value to anyone else."). Other
writers have recognized the importance of constraints on gatekeeper inclinations to act
opportunistically, emphasizing reputation as the primary constraint on opportunistic behavior.
See, e.g., Niloy Bose & Richard Cothren, Asymmetric Information and Loan Contracts in a
Neoclassical Growth Model, 29 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 423, 429-30 (1997) (discussing
reputational effects in the context of borrowers and lenders); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 527 (1981) (providing examples of
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First we begin with the recognition that the greater the
potential loss for forfeiture of the bond, the less likely it is that the
applicant will provide inaccurate information. Notably, this is likely to
be the case whether or not the information is historical or relates to
the likely future compliance of the applicant. Regarding historical
facts, the prospect of a future loss in the event that the information is
later found to be inaccurate should create incentives for the applicant
to be compliant. With respect to future visa compliance, the ongoing
possibility of a loss should motivate the applicant to ensure that her
behavior is compliant. In either event, what has been termed the
bond's "verificatory" power increases as the size of the bond
increases. 50
However, as the size of the bond increases, so does the
incentive for the gatekeeper to execute on the bond in an opportunistic
manner, even if the applicant has not violated its terms. This may not
seem to be a real danger in the U.S. context, where there is
where
and
administration
immigration
in
transparency
intermediaries who finance bonds would presumably be regulated by
some independent authority. However, in the Middle East, there have
been allegations that government officials (in collusion with broker
intermediaries, to whom guest workers sometimes pay high interest to
post bonds on their behalf) have opportunistically threatened bond
forfeiture to force the early exit of law-abiding aliens.5 1 One obvious

when reputational concerns do not deter opportunism); D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital
Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 133, 140-42 (1998)
(discussing the problem of opportunism in venture capital relationships, and how reputational
concerns offer a potential check).
50. Mann, supra note 48, at 2232.
51. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BAD DREAMS: EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE OF MIGRANT
WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA 19-23 (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11999/
section/i (discussing the exploitation of migrant workers by their employers and sponsors in
Saudi Arabia). A further challenge is that bonds have sometimes not been returned, even when
guest workers have met the conditions of their visas. The likelihood of such abuses even in an
ostensibly law-bound regime is not low. Indeed, a similar problem occurred in the now-infamous
Bracero ("farmhand") guest-worker program, under which hundreds of thousands of Mexican
guest workers traveled to the U.S. as agricultural workers between the 1942 and 1964. As an
incentive to encourage return to Mexico, the U.S. government retained Social Security
contributions, with a commitment that payments would be made to guest workers upon their
return home to Mexico. However, such payments were made to many guest workers only after
decades of litigation. For a general discussion of the program's failings, see Douglas S. Massey &
Zai Liang, The Long-Term Consequences of a Temporary Worker Program: The US Bracero
Experience, 8 POPULATION RES. & POLY REV. 199, 221 (1989). The program was inaugurated
under a bilateral agreement with Mexico during World War II to meet critical agricultural labor
shortages and ultimately involved widespread visa overstays and deportations. For background
information on the program's origins, see KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO
PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION AND THE I.N.S. 2 (1992); BARBARA A. DRISCOLL, THE TRACKS NORTH:
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institutional design solution to this challenge is to establish a
transparent mechanism with independent judges to determine the
circumstances under which forfeiture is appropriate. While this
innovation should mitigate this danger, the institutional cost is high;
thus, it would still be ideal to design a bond that reduces the
incentives for the gatekeeper to act opportunistically even while it
continues to provide a sufficient deterrent to the visa holder.
Other institutional design innovations might lower the
likelihood of opportunism by gatekeepers. For example, in the
contracting context, the literature discusses asymmetrically punitive
bonds, when the applicant posts a bond that has value particular to
her (and is not likely to be realized at as high a price in the
marketplace). Indeed, one might think of a range of items that have
some peculiar personal value to the alien (such as family heirlooms or
inherited land) as meeting these criteria. 52 Such a bond becomes far
more valuable to the applicant than to the gatekeeper.
The larger point is that an appropriately-designed bond should
not be merely compensatory, but also punitive. That is, the loss to the
applicant should exceed the gain from providing inaccurate
information (either as it relates to historical information or predicted
future compliance) divided by the probability that such inaccuracy
would later be discovered.
D. The Implications of the Involvement of FinancialIntermediaries
Drawing on insights from the scholarship on contracts, one
could imagine a number of bond-design innovations that would ensure
that the bond is close to perfectly punitive. In this Section, to mitigate
distributive justice concerns, I propose that the government should
provide an incentive for third-party financial intermediaries to finance
the bonds in a transparent manner. An additional advantage of this
approach is that bond financiers will have incentives to ensure that
THE RAILROAD BRACERO PROGRAM OF WORLD WAR II 53-55 (1999);
MERCHANTS OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY 15 (1964).

ERNESTO GALARZA,

52. For a discussion of this type of property, see Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959-61 (1982) (arguing that some "objects are closely bound
up with personhood because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing
personal entities in the world" and providing examples of "a wedding ring, a portrait, an
heirloom, or a house"). There are also other institutional innovations which might be applicable.
For example, Mann discusses interlocking bond arrangements in which "the process for forfeiting
the bonds is structured so that the lender effectively posts its reputation as a bond against
improper execution of the bond posted by the borrower; the result is an interlocking verification
arrangement, with each party posting a bond to the other." Mann, supra note 48, at 2233. Such
an arrangement would perhaps have greater applicability if the government outsourced the
gatekeeping function to some other entity (such as in the Kuwaiti example above).
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the bonds are appropriately punitive so as to mitigate the risk of
default (on both the visa and the loan).
Generally, bond financiers will have incentives to develop the
appropriate innovations in bond design. Indeed, a preliminary review
of the scholarship on financing arrangements at the bottom of the
pyramid indicates that financial intermediaries (often working in
conditions of informality, and indeed, even illegality) have a range of
mechanisms for estimating and pricing risk, and for enforcing credit
terms. 53 Some of these mechanisms of enforcement would undoubtedly
be impermissible in a transparent, law-bound bond-financing
program. Nevertheless, this literature supports the point that
financial intermediaries at the bottom of the pyramid, like
conventional financiers, are able to create innovative devices for
constraining risk, such as hedging by spreading their loans among
different populations. For example, money lenders will make loans to
factory workers and farmers as opposed to only farmers, since farmers
might all be similarly unable to service their loans in the event of an
unanticipated event such as a drought. Indeed, in motivating financial
government in essence may
intermediaries to finance visa bonds, the
54
process.
bond-design
the
be outsourcing
There is an additional advantage of the involvement of
financial intermediaries. Bonding mechanisms provide additional
information from sources other than the applicant (known in the
literature as "second order" information), which can further assist the
gatekeeper in determining the accuracy of the applicant's original
assertion ("first order" information). However, the second order
information is not reliable simply because its source is some entity
other than the applicant. The gatekeeper is still obligated to evaluate
the second order information. This information review could be
repeated iteratively until some external entity provides independent
verification of the reliability of the information. 55 Notably, these
financial intermediaries would be properly motivated to independently
verify the reliability of any information on the applicant as a condition
of extending a loan: indeed, this likely would constitute an essential
part of their underwriting process.

53.

See, e.g., STUART RUTHERFORD, THE POOR AND THEIR MONEY 60 (2001) (discussing the

types of entities that provide informal financial services to poor people).
54. Nevertheless, the fact that the gatekeeper is ultimately the government (instead of a
private party) may impose practical limitations on some of these arrangements.
55. See Mann, supra note 48, at 2232 (making this point about the evaluation of secondorder information).
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E. The Relative Advantages of Bonding Arrangements
1. Context Sensitivity
The due diligence process provides little context sensitivity; it
can both over- and under-reach, by requiring the same information of
the law-abiding prospective migrant who is not an overstay risk as it
does of the non-law-abiding prospective migrant who is an overstay
risk. The bottom line is that due diligence processes are often
ineffective and expensive.
The emphasis on assurances also appears to be ineffective. By
the time the government has realized that the information provided in
the due diligence process is inaccurate and assurances have been
violated, the visa recipient has usually disappeared into the
underground economy. 56 Thus, visa revocation and the accompanying
threat of deportation do not constitute a meaningful penalty for many
migrants when the odds of ever being caught and deported are in their
57
favor.
There is a more fundamental reason that the traditional
approaches appear to be falling short of the goals of effective screening
and sanctioning. As we have learned from the contracting context,
formal legal rules are often inadequate when sensitivity to context is
important to obtain appropriate commitments from parties with
superior information. Through the application of formal legal rules, in
isolation, the government may obtain commitments that are either
disproportionate or insufficient given the special circumstances of a
situation.
For analogous reasons, it is unrealistic to expect the
government to create and extract appropriate commitments from
particular applicants on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, even if it was
possible to develop such commitments in broad form or on a case-bycase basis, enforcement through the legal process is likely to be
prohibitively expensive. The benefit of a bonding system is that it
draws on lessons from privately developed and enforced sanctioning

56. Demetrios G. Papademetriou & Nicholas DiMarzio, A Preliminary Profile of
Unapprehended Undocumented Aliens in Northern New Jersey: A Research Note, 19 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 746, 746 (1985); see also Martin & Teitelbaum, supra note 9, at 120 (arguing
that temporary guest-worker programs lead to permanent stays in the host country); Demetrios
G. Papademetriou, European Labor Migration: Consequences for the Countriesof Worker Origin,
22 INT'L STUD. Q. 377, 394 (1978) (finding that policies aimed at curbing immigration have had
at best moderate success).
57. See Martin & Teitelbaum, supra note 9, at 129 (pointing out that guest workers have
been able to settle in a host country despite legal restraints on their ability to do so).
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arrangements that have been effective largely in the absence of
intervention from public enforcers.
2. Changing the Default Rule of Nonenforcement
Beyond providing context sensitivity, bonding systems also can
change what I will refer to as the "default rule of nonenforcement" for
visa noncompliance. Documented aliens who become undocumented
are easily absorbed into dense ethnic networks that facilitate
employment in the absence of documentation. 58 Public enforcers
generally are unable to penetrate these networks without incurring
extraordinary costs. 59 Since a defaulting alien may be sanctioned only
if she is found, and she is rarely found, enforcement is the exception
60
rather than the rule.
One might envision a continuum with a variety of levels of
enforcement. On one end of the continuum is the status quo-because
those who breach usually elude deportation, the current default rule is
nonenforcement. 61 On the other end of the continuum is enforcement
58. Nancy Foner's study of Anglophone West Indian migrant domestic workers supports
this point. Many West Indian migrants overstay their tourist visas and become undocumented.
Yet, even without documentation, they easily obtain work as domestic caregivers of children and
the elderly through a strong referral network of fellow West Indian domestic workers. Foner also

discusses qualitative field work among other migrant populations which support the same point.
NANCY FONER, IN A NEW LAND: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF IMMIGRATION 164-65 (2005); see also
HSIANG-SHUI CHEN, CHINATOWN No MORE: TAIWAN IMMIGRANTS IN CONTEMPORARY NEW YORK

254-55 (1992) (noting that several sociological studies have shown immigrant associations can
aid immigrants in obtaining employment); Alejandro Portes, Economic Sociology and the
Sociology of Immigration: A Conceptual Overview, in THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF
IMMIGRATION: ESSAYS ON NETWORKS, ETHNICITY, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1, 24-25 (Alejandro

Portes ed., 1995) (describing how immigrants who migrate into host countries where their
conationals have become well-established experience greater economic opportunity).
59.

See DAN KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 8-9

(2007) (describing extraordinary U.S. government efforts to foster deportation of aliens already
in the country).
60. For good reason, Manns refers to the typical undocumented alien as "judgment-proof."
Manns, supranote 15, at 896.
61. Following the convention in the literature on the economic sociology of immigration, for
practical purposes, I consider deportation to be synonymous with sanctioning. One might
reasonably question this assumption: If a guest worker overstays his visa, and the host country
deports him, why is this not simply an enforcement of a contractual obligation to which the guest
worker agreed in the first place? Indeed, there is a longstanding debate in immigration law
regarding whether deportation should be viewed as a punishment at all. The question has
obvious constitutional implications, given the constitutional protections that attach when crimes
are punished. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that "[an]
order of deportation is not a punishment for crime"); cf. Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation,Social
Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1890, 1891 (2000) (discussing the convergence between the criminal justice and deportation
systems and the questions it raises); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporationof Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 473 (2007)
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under a bonding system, under which full enforcement against a
noncompliant alien involves both forfeiture of the bond and
deportation. One might envision an "in between" system of partial
enforcement, in which the bond is forfeited, but the government does
not deport. A bonding system changes the default rule. Since the
government can easily confiscate the bond proceeds even in the
absence of deportation, the default rule is one of partial enforcement.
This "half-way" option is arguably preferable to the status quo of
nonenforcement, particularly if an applicant defaulting on a bond (and
presumably on the loan) tarnishes her reputation with her home62
country bank and neighbors.
Moreover, with institutional design innovations, one may
substantially increase the likelihood of deportation, thus leading to
full enforcement. For example, as discussed in Part III below, thirdparty bond financiers may be motivated to find defaulting aliens and
either report them to the authorities or convince them to self-deport
by giving back part of the bond to the alien, on the condition of her
return home. While self-deportation may not fulfill the "expressive"
public function that we typically associate with conventional sanctions
(that is, communicating the deportee's bad behavior to the public), 63
self-deportation nevertheless accomplishes the same practical
purpose-excluding the alien from the United States. 64 Moreover, self-

(arguing that theories of deportation overlap so substantially with those of criminal punishment
that deportation should at least sometimes be regarded as a form of punishment).
62. Indeed, one might even argue that as long as the government retains the bond, the
"halfway" default rule is a sanction unless an alien demonstrates compliance.
63. While deportation is not technically considered punishment, it is clearly understood as a
shame-inducing punishment by deportees, their families, and the communities from which they
originate. See KANSTROOM, supra note 59, at 15 (equating deportation with punishment); Dan M.
Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477,
2483 (1997) (articulating the importance of the "expressive" function of punishment); Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 964 (1996) (discussing the
expressive function of law).
64. Tamar Jacoby, a prominent conservative thinker, has noted that the self-deportation
approach is virtuous in that it represents a middle ground in the immigration debate and
bypasses the cumbersome federal bureaucracy. John Fund, Is Cannon Fodder? One GOP
Congressman May Lose His Seat for His Pro-Immigration Views, While Another Offers a
Compromise, WALL ST. J. OPINION J., May 29, 2006. Blog postings indicate that some
immigration law scholars and practitioners are skeptical of self-deportation. See, e.g., Bill 0.
Hing, ICE Self-Deportation Plan, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (July 30, 2008), http:/flawprofessors.
typepad.com/immigration/2008/07/ice-self-deport.html (quoting Frank Sharry as saying "This
sounds like a policy straight out of a 'Saturday Night Live' skit, not a serious proposal."); Kevin
R. Johnson, Government Ads Nudge Immigrants to Self-Deport, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Aug.
13, 2008), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2008/08/government-adshtml
(also
expressing skepticism).
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deportation can be accomplished at a substantially lower cost than
65
typically is incurred by the government under the current system.
II. INCENTIVIZING FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES

A. The Proposalin Broad Outline
This Part will discuss why unconventional mechanisms of
enforcing loan agreements are essential to banks in developing
countries. These insights are the foundation for the proposed
institutional innovations for visa-as-collateral. 66 I begin by laying out
the proposal in broad outline.
The U.S. government is the first gatekeeper. Assume that a
visa officer in the local embassy approves an applicant. The visa
officer would issue the prospective visa recipient with a provisional
"visa license." This visa license would signify conditional approval for
receiving a U.S. visa, contingent on a demonstrated ability to post a
bond.
The typical applicant would be unable to post a bond without a
loan. The prospective visa recipient would then present her
conditional visa license to a bank in her country of origin as part of
her loan application. In this proposal, the bank becomes the second

65. See generally Fund, supra note 64 (discussing a proposal that would give incentives for
illegal aliens to leave the country and apply to be legal guest workers).
66. The proposal is not that the visa would constitute actual collateral, but rather that the
visa would serve similar purposes for a secured lender as those that have traditionally been
served by secured credit. However, there are clearly significant differences between a visa as a
collateral-like device and traditional secured credit. First, visas are not typically assignablethough the software model is useful to discuss how assigning visas might theoretically be done.
See Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing,85 CORNELL L. REV. 134, 151-53
(1999). Thus, they would hardly constitute "general intangibles" in UCC terms. See U.C.C. § 9102(a)(42) (2005) (" 'General Intangible' means any personal property, including things in action,
other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods,
instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or
other minerals before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software."). Second,
even if there were an assignable property right in a federally issued visa (as a license), there
would undoubtedly be concerns regarding debt servitude. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Making
Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373,
1386-87 (1997) (noting that there are ethical lines that limit security, such as the prohibition on
servitude). For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the prohibition on debt servitude,
see COLEMAN, supra note 24, at 41, 77, 138, 147 n.ll, 164-65, 218-19. Third, there would be no
actual foreclosure rights. The notion of tying loan compliance to visa compliance (and vice versa)
brings to mind cross-default provisions that are common in private loan contracts. While bankers
typically insist in loan contracts that borrowers meet their regulatory obligations as a condition
of the loan, a default in the other direction (i.e., regulators insisting that borrowers meet their
loan obligations) is unusual, and unsurprisingly, I have not been able to find a discussion of such
practices (or even proposals) in the literature.
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gatekeeper. By providing only conditional approval for a visa, the U.S.
government would be seeking an assurance from this second
gatekeeper that the prospective visa recipient has a good risk profile.
Notably, the bank will be assessing the visa applicant's risk
profile with respect to not only financial compliance-normally the
bank's primary concern-but also visa compliance. Recall that the
typical applicant will not likely be able to service the large loan
needed to post a bond solely through employment in her country of
origin given her poor earning potential. She will only be able to service
the loan if she is able to work in the United States by remaining
compliant with her visa. Thus, a consideration of the likelihood of visa
compliance is critical to the loan underwriting process.
In order to create incentives for banks to perform this
gatekeeping function and finance the bond, the U.S. government must
address the bank's own difficulties in enforcing loan contracts. To this
end, the U.S. government will tie visa compliance to loan compliance
by making two commitments to the prospective lender. First, the U.S.
government would agree not to renew the visa without being satisfied
that the loan is in good standing. Thus, in the event of a default, the
bank can be secure in the knowledge that there is an implicit penalty,
namely nonrenewal of a visa.
Second, if the applicant does not comply with her visa terms,
risking default on the bond, the bank should still be able to recoup
some significant portion of the bond if it is able to provide evidence to
the U.S. government that the defaulting visa recipient has selfdeported within some reasonable time period. The proportion of the
bond recouped should be indexed to the speed of self-deportation. This
will provide an incentive for banks to perform a critical function that
public enforcers traditionally have found difficult, namely, the
expeditious exclusion of visa overstayers from the United States.
Of course banks could always "snitch" on a noncompliant alien
to the public enforcers. However, this proposal's emphasis is on selfdeportation because it achieves the same goal without public
intervention. Thus, banks should receive a greater proportion of the
bond if deportation is accomplished at a lower cost without the
intervention of the authorities.
B. Interviews with Jamaican Guest Workers and Lenders
I conducted qualitative field work as a supplement to the
theoretical arguments in order to aid in assessment of the importance

2011]

VISA AS PROPERTY

1073

and practical feasibility of the proposal. 67 This work consisted of focus
groups with Jamaican subsistence farmers who have traveled to North
America as agricultural guest workers. The research in this
population is instructive since Jamaicans are among the most likely
68
populations on a per-capita basis to migrate to the United States.
Moreover, after Mexico, Jamaica supplies the largest absolute
numbers of documented guest workers to the United States;
additionally, preliminary estimates indicate that low-skilled
Jamaicans fall within the top five nationalities on a per-capita basis in
the undocumented population. 69 I had previously worked with this
population.70 The findings are summarized below.
Although interviewees discussed a range of options, the bottom
line was that the subjects currently have few options to finance bigticket items, such as visa expenses. When they do finance such
expenses, they are likely to rely on family or informal financial
intermediaries. There was a notable bifurcation in their attitudes
towards formal financial intermediates. While they generally had
skeptical attitudes about formal financial intermediaries because of
perceived hostile lending practices, they simultaneously believed that
they had a better chance of obtaining loans than their similarly

67. In other areas of legal scholarship, ethnographic research or qualitative field work has
shed light on interdisciplinary analyses of compliance, both in contract law and in the criminal
law. For an article that is a paradigmatic example of qualitative field work in the area of
contract law and secured transactions, see Mann, supra note 66, at 151-53 (conducting a
qualitative field study of software companies and their bankers). For articles that summarize the
influence of ethnographic work on compliance in the context of criminal law, see Kahan, supra
note 63, at 2477-78; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner
City, 32 LAw & SoC'Y REV. 805, 809-13 (1998); Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug
Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 193 (1998).
68. Milton Vickerman, Jamaica, in THE NEW AMERICANS: A GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION SINCE
1965, at 479 (Mary C. Waters & Reed Ueda eds., 2007). Vickerman notes that the Jamaicans
consistently express a high desire to migrate and that the emigration rate is propelled "by an
entrenched tradition of migration and economic hardship." Id. Taking into account the
population size, the emigration rate is very high, with migrant Jamaicans constituting a third of
Jamaica's population. Id. Vickerman states that as recently as 2001, Jamaicans were the second
most likely population on a per capita basis to migrate to the United States. Id.
69. For a broader discussion, which includes a short section on high levels of noncompliance
by Jamaicans with immigration laws in the United States, see Zagros Madid-Sadjadi & Dillon
Alleyne, The PotentialJamaican Impact of Criminal Deportees from the U.S., 5 J. ETHNICITY &
CRIM. JUST. 29 (2007). Utilizing statistical modeling, the authors provide indicative statistics on
the number of Jamaicans in the undocumented population. The authors' estimates regarding the
representation of Jamaicans among the undocumented population in the United States arise
from research conducted by the Remittance Research Project in the Department of Economics at
the Jamaica Mona Campus of the University of the West Indies. See also Vickerman, supra note
68, at 479 (providing data about Jamaican immigration to the U.S.).
70. Brown, supra note 48, at 2475-76.
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situated nonmigrant peers, because of their healthy revenue streams
while working overseas in the form of remittances.
I then conducted
interviews
with formal financial
intermediaries to assess whether their experience of providing
financial services to poor, rural Jamaicans coincided with the views of
the focus group participants. Most financial intermediaries conceded
that they usually insisted on collateral for loans, a practice which
excluded most prospective migrant clients. While the banks rarely
expected to recoup value in the event of a loan default, the primary
rationale offered for an insistence on collateral was that it allowed
them to issue strategic threats to potential defaulters. However, the
banking interviewees had significant concerns regarding enforcement
of loan terms. Bankers believed that it would be difficult to secure
repossession of collateral by state actors, even if they received
favorable judgments in Jamaican courts.
The proposed institutional innovations of visa-as-collateral
discussed in Part IV are influenced by the interview findings.
C. Methodology
The study was not meant to be a detailed study of financial
intermediation, for which the gold standard of economic ethnographic
work is a review of diaries in which subjects keep precise records of
their financial transactions. 7 1 The research design was entirely
72
qualitative and the study methodology was multi-method in focus.
This is a difficult-to-reach population and partly for this reason, the
study was not randomized. Utilizing referrals from previous work in
this population, I developed a snowball sample, a method which is
often used in qualitative field work for subjects with similar
characteristics. 73 The typical subject was a resident of a rural

71. See, e.g., RUTHERFORD, supra note 53, at vii-viii (describing his methodology, based
largely on personal investigation and research); see also COLLINS ET AL., supra note 28, at 2-3
(describing why traditional economic and anthropological tools are problematic in studying how
the poor manage their money).
72. I acknowledge the help of Mr. Densil Reid, who has significant experience in fieldwork
in rural agricultural populations.
73. Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein, whose work has been utilized in the legal scholarship on
entitlement programs, employed a similar methodology in their landmark study of a difficult-toreach population, namely, single mothers on welfare. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in
Welfare Administration:Rules, Discretion and EntrepreneurialGovernment, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1121, 1171-72 (2000) (citing KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE
MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 220 (1997)). The methodology of this study
was influenced by grounded theory approaches to qualitative research. See ANSELM STRAUSS &
JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: GROUNDED THEORY PROCEDURES AND
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Jamaican community, who had previously had a guest-worker visa
74
and expressed an interest in working in the United States again. I
75
have all interviews and interview notes on file.
D. Summary of Focus Group Findings
I explained the bonding proposal to the focus-group
participants. Although I did not provide an estimate of the average
value of a deterrent bond, focus group participants understood that it
would be significant since the average Jamaican agricultural worker
quadruples his family's earnings as a guest worker in the United
76
States.
Most respondents described themselves as being "well-off' in
relation to their similarly situated nonmigrant neighbors, due largely
to their overseas earnings. Most emphasized that prior to their initial
receipt of a guest-worker visa, they had found it difficult to raise funds
for migration-related costs, such as passport and visa fees. Given the
difficulty in raising funds for these relatively modest costs, interview
subjects felt sure that the cost of a bond would be prohibitive for those
who did not have access to a loan.

TECHNIQUES 21 (1990) (describing different methods of qualitative research and their relative
benefits).
74. Although tourism workers are now eligible to access the United States as guest
workers, in Jamaica, these persons are not understood to be low-skilled because they have
received some formal training in trade schools, and complete tests to gain certifications. As such,
I restricted the sample to persons who are understood to be "low-skilled," namely agricultural
workers. Their access to overseas labor markets is the most restricted, since they are considered
high risks for immigration infractions. They typically lack formal training, are low-income, and
are poorly situated to provide the evidence of formal ties to Jamaica (including hard assets such
as land) that are typically required to demonstrate their suitability for visas. For a description of
the snowball sampling technique as it has been applied in studies of low-skilled migrants, see
Wayne Cornelius, Interviewing Undocumented Immigrants: MethodologicalReflections Based on
Fieldwork in Mexico and the United States, 16 INTL MIGRATION REV. 378, 378-411 (1982).
75. The final sample included eighteen workers. In keeping with the practice in such
studies to maintain the privacy of interviewees in these small, closely knit communities, they are
identified by their initials. They include DR1, MK, DR2, AB, WM, LM, FC, CL, BR, EC, JH, DD,
DO, MS, DM, LM, DD and DP.
76. This estimate is based on a survey of funds remitted by guest workers conducted by the
Remittance Research Group in the Department of Economics at the University of the West
Indies. Notably, it was not possible based on the available research to segregate the earnings of
U.S. guest workers (as opposed to Canadian guest workers). See SIR ARTHUR LEwIS INST. OF
Soc.& ECON. STUD., JAMAICA SURVEY OF LIVING CONDITIONS 2007, available at http://salises
.mona.uwi.edu/databanklslc2007/survey0/index.html. Jamaicans who are able to travel to the
United States to work experience a substantial "place premium," namely the wage gain accruing
to foreign workers who arrive in the United States. The average thirty-five-year-old Jamaican in
the United States with nine years of education earns 3.63 times what he would earn in Jamaica.
Clemens et al, supra note 19, at 11.
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Focus group participants also indicated that they might have
access to financing through informal sources. The predominant
mechanism of financial intermediation appeared to be informal
savings clubs or "partners," the indigenous parlance for Rotating
Savings and Credit Associations ("ROSCAs"), 77 organized by church
groups, community clubs, and farming associations. 78 Respondents'
attitudes towards formal financial institutions demonstrated an
interesting bifurcation. They seemed aware of one lending program
offered by a prominent local financial institution, which was
specifically targeted at migrants who were regular remitters (that is,
migrants who sent funds regularly back to Jamaica while working
overseas). 79 However, even though they were aware of this program in
the abstract, they appeared overwhelmingly skeptical about being able
to borrow from any formal financial institutions. Even though only one
respondent had ever approached a formal financial institution for a
loan, they repeatedly stated that the institutions' lending policies were
not conducive to rural farmers since most did not have collateral other
than their farms, which many seemed unwilling to put at risk.8 0
77. Timothy Besley et al., The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, in
READINGS INTHE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 386 (Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray eds.,
2001), describe ROSCAs as follows:
[M] embers commit to putting a fixed sum of money into a 'pot' for each period of the
life of the ROSCA. Lots are drawn, and the pot is randomly allocated to one of the
members. In the next period, the process repeats itself, except that the previous
winner is excluded from the draw for the pot. The process continues, with every past
winner excluded, until each member of the ROSCA has received the pot once. At this
point, the ROSCA is either disbanded or begins over again.
78. Indeed, respondents appeared to be involved in other risk-pooling arrangements, such
as informal agricultural insurance arrangements. For example, farmer A commits to sharing his
crop with farmer B if a catastrophic event such as a fire occurs and vice versa. For a good
summary of some of the research in this area, see Abigail Barr, Marleen Dekker & Marcel
Fafchamps, Risk Sharing Relations and Enforcement Mechanisms 26 (Ctr. for the Study of
African Economies, Working Paper No. 2008-14, 2008), available at http://www.csae.ox.ac
.uklworkingpapers/wps-list.html.
79. This institution is the Jamaica National Building Society ("JN").
80. Indeed, studies by Erica Field and Maximo Torero and by Sebastian Galiani and
Ernesto Schargrodsky have found a similar unwillingness to put homes at risk to access loans
among the urban poor in several Latin American cities. Erica Field & Maximo Torero, Do
Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling
Program 5 (Mar. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.economics.
harvard.edu/faculty/field/filesfFieldTorerocs.pdf;
Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky,
Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling 26 (Centro de Investigacion en Finanzas,
Working Paper No. 06/2005, 2005), available at http://www.utdt.edu/Upload/CIF-wp/wpcif062005.pdf.
The difficulty that farmers experience in accessing credit in developing countries is
supported by other research. Indeed, this appears to be a primary motivator for migration. In the
1990s, a sudden surge of Pakistani farmers traveled overseas as guest workers. Research
indicates that lack of access to credit was the major factor accounting for the upsurge. Pakistani
farmers seeking to take advantage of the Green Revolution found themselves unable to buy
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Nevertheless, they believed that they were better positioned than
their peers to access loan financing given that they already had
superior access to informal financial intermediation (in the form of
ROSCAs) and were known in their communities for their overseas
81
earnings.
E. How Migrants Currently Finance Their Relocation Costs
The economic ethnography literature demonstrates that
virtually all financial intermediation services currently utilized by the
poor exist in the informal economy,8 2 and the same is true for poor
migrants. Typically, poor migrants are unable to obtain visas and
must locate a "coyote," namely, an underground broker 3 who is
willing to transport them through clandestine cross-border networks
and then seek financing for coyote fees. 84 Coyote fees are typically
prohibitive for the average migrant.8 5 Migrants who already have

expensive fertilizers. A primary rationale for migration was either to generate funds for their
own farms or to generate excess cash to make loans to other farmers. Thus, migration emerged
as an innovative credit mechanism to deal with "a vacuum in ... rural credit facilities." Alain
Lefebvre International Labor Migration from Two Pakistani Villages with Different Forms of
Agriculture, 29 PAK. DEV. REV., 59, 73 (1990), available at http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/PDR/1990/
Volume l/59-90.pdf. Interestingly, the rate of migration was highest among members of the landowning castes that had title to their land. In anticipation of the remittances that migration
would generate (allowing them to service a loan), they were then better able to access credit from
informal sources such as social networks than their nonmigrant peers. When they earn funds
overseas, they prioritize paying back these loans to maintain family honor. Id. at 77-78. A
similar study of migration patterns of Egyptian guest workers who had previously been farmers
found similar results. The primary rationale for migration appeared to be the inability to access
credit at home to upgrade their farms. Richard H. Adams, Worker Remittances and Inequality in
Rural Egypt, 38 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 45, 45-71 (1989).
81. Manuel Orozco, Remittances in Latin America and the Caribbean: Their Impact on
Local Economies and the Response of Local Governments, in DECENTRALIZATION AND THE
CHALLENGES TO THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 25, 27-28 (Org. of Am. States ed., 2008),
availableat http://www.oas.org/sap/publications/2008/English%20Decentraliztion.pdf.
82. RUTHERFORD, supra note 53, at 32.
83. Professor David Spener has conducted ethnographic research on coyote transportation.
For a representative publication that includes some of this work, see DAVID SPENER,
CLANDESTINE CROSSINGS (2009). There is preliminary evidence that these coyote networks have
been taken over by transnational drug gangs, which are cash-rich and able to provide loans to
finance transportation and to penalize defaulters. Joel Millman, Immigrants Become Hostages as
Gangs Prey on Mexicans, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2009, at Al.
84. For example, the average coyote fee from Mexico is $2,500, which is more than one-third
of the average per-capita income of a rural Mexican national. Although the per-capita GNI of
Mexico is approximately $7,600, rural Mexicans are considerably poorer. WORLD BANK, MEXICO
AT A GLANCE 1 (2009), available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/mex.-aag.pdf.
85. The equivalent figure from Guatemala is roughly $10,000-nearly three times the
average per capita income of a Guatemalan-and from El Salvador the figure is in excess of
$10,000-more than three times the average per-capita income. Miriam Jordan, Latest
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social networks in the United States can take low-interest loans from
their friends, family, or informal savings clubs, which are generally
sustained by remittances from relatives overseas; this appears to be a
popular method of financing.8 6 If these sources are unavailable,
migrants typically seek to obtain financing from a local money lender,
where interest rates appear to be extremely high (studies estimate
these on an annualized basis as ranging from 50 percent to 120
87
depending on the particulars of the local market).
percentMigrants
also have another option: they may obtain financing
from a coyote. The implicit interest rates charged by coyotes appear to
be exorbitant, exceeding even the very high rates of local money
lenders. 88 The willingness of coyotes to extend credit appears to
depend on a number of factors beyond the perceived default risk of the
client, including coyotes' capability to enforce informal "loan contracts"
if a borrower defaults, their historical tenure in the coyote business,
and their overhead costs. 89 There is evidence that even when border

passage is not clandestine, these conditions may still persist. For
example, although migration from South Asia to the Gulf is almost
entirely documented (that is, migrants have valid visas), money
lenders and labor brokers appear to enforce loan contracts for
migration expenses with explicit and implicit threats of violence. 90

Immigration Wave: Retreat, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2008, at Al (finding that Guatemalan migrant
paid $5,700 in initial coyote fees, but after interest amount totaled $10,000).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Interview with David Spener, supra note 4. Notably, the coyote's capability to enforce
loan contracts appears to be high, particularly if they operate as subsidiaries of illegal narcotics
gang networks. Josh Meyer, Drug Cartels Raise the Stakes on Human Smuggling, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/newslnationworld/nation/la-na-human-smuggling232009mar23,0,3465454.story; see also Hussein Sadruddin, Natalia Walter & Jose Hidalgo, Human
Trafficking in the United States: Expanding Victim Protection Beyond Prosecution Witnesses, 16
STAN. L. & POLY REV. 379, 382-84 (2005) (discussing factors that influence coyotes' business).
90. For instances of this phenomenon, see generally FRITZ BOUMAN, SMALL SHORT AND
UNSECURED: INFORMAL RURAL FINANCE IN INDIA (1989); PRABHU GHATE & ARINDAM DAS-GUPTA,
INFORMAL FINANCE: SOME FINDINGS FROM ASIA (1992); Ifran Aleem, Imperfect Information,
Screening and the Costs of Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan, 4
WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 329 (1990); A. Braverman & T.N. Srinivasan, Credit and
Sharecroppingin Agrarian Societies, 9 J. DEV. ECON. 289 (1981); A.K. Ghose, The Formation of
Usurious Interest Rates, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 169 (1980); Meenal Patole & Orlanda Ruthven,
Metro Moneylenders: Microcredit Providers for Delhi's Poor, 13 SMALL ENTERPRISE DEV. 36
(2001).
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F. The Background Legal Context
For my friends, anything; for my enemies, the law.
- Oscar R. Benavides, Former President of Peru 91
Lenders confirmed the views of migrant respondents that there
are few formal financial services available to them. Notably, these
lenders typically insisted on collateral. Among those that engage in
noncollateral-based (that is, unsecured) lending, most engage in
micro-lending.
Lenders cited as a primary factor in their reluctance to lend to
the poor the pervasive uncertainty regarding the likelihood of
enforcement of loan contracts and repossession of collateral.
Specifically, the interviewees' concerns centered on six different
possibilities:
1. Firms were concerned that the de jure policy surrounding
loan contracts may change;
2. Firms were concerned that the de jure rules surrounding
the repossession of collateral may change;
3. Even if the de jure rules surrounding loan contracts did not
change, there could be a gap between de jure rules and
judicial application of these rules to the facts of their case;
4. Even if the de jure rules surrounding repossession of
collateral did not change, there could be a gap between de
jure rules and judicial application of these rules to the facts
of their case;
5. Even if the courts ruled in their favor with respect to loan
contracts, there could be a gap between the courts'
judgments and the de facto implementation of these
judgments by state actors; and
6. Even if the courts ruled in their favor with respect to
repossession of collateral, there could be a gap between
courts' judgments and the de facto implementation of these
judgments by state actors.
The last two factors were of particular concern. Lenders
expressed more confidence in the legal rules and the judiciary
responsible for their administration than they did in the likelihood
that state actors would enforce favorable rulings. The interviewees
articulated two independent concerns regarding institutional quality.
First, there is a concern regarding the institutional quality of the

91.

I am grateful to Lant Pritchett for pointing out this quotation to me.
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judicial branch (that is, the judicial application of rules to the facts of
a particular case) not because of perceived corruption, but because the
judicial branch is poorly resourced, resulting in long delays in rulings.
Second, there is a concern regarding the institutional quality of the
state actors responsible for implementing the courts' judgments into
credible enforcement actions. This finding demonstrates that weak
judicial systems
undermine
the
likelihood
that financial
intermediaries will rely on a de jure rule being translated into a
judicial decision, and in turn, weak state actors undermine the
likelihood that financial intermediaries will rely on de facto
implementation of judicial decisions. Given this legal context, in the
event that bankers do lend, such lending is unlikely to be subject to
broad-based and equally-applied rules. On the contrary, lending is
more likely to be based on deals, namely, highly specific
accommodations for individual borrowers or groups of borrowers.
G. The FourPrinciples Underlying the Extension of
Credit to the Poor
Against a background of pervasive informality and legal
uncertainty, Jamaican banks offered rationales for their lending
practices that seem somewhat unconventional in light of traditional
theories of lending in the legal scholarship. Four principles appear to
undergird lending to the poor. First, banks may forego collateral-based
lending altogether if they have a relationship with or share a
community with the borrower and thus have ample information about
him or her. Second, when they forego collateral-based lending, they
structure contracts that enable them to extract a penalty from the
borrower even if they are unable to recoup their funds. Third, such
penalties are often extracted in a manner that minimizes the need for
enforcement by a poorly developed, unreliable, and inaccessible legal
system. Finally, in a context of pervasive legal uncertainty, collateral
is still valuable, and where it is available, banks may accept collateral
not primarily for its liquidation value, but rather for the ability that it
provides banks to strategically threaten the borrower with seizure in
order to motivate her repayment.
1. The Difficulties Surrounding Collateral May Lead Banks to Forego
Collateral or Enforcement of Their Repossession Rights
Even if poor households have available collateral, banks may
still be wary of accepting such collateral, and even if they accept it,
they may forego enforcement of their repossession rights in the event
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of a default. 92 This finding is surprising, particularly against the
background of a plethora of scholarship in both law and economics
arguing that one strategy to mitigate credit rationing is to enable
asset building so that the poor are able to offer collateral. 93 Yet, the
empirical evidence regarding this particular claim is decidedly mixed
and suggests that the skepticism of collateral-based lending that I
found among Jamaican banks may be widespread in the developing
world. 94 My interviews in Jamaica suggested that banks consider the
existence of a reliable legal system-through which a bank can enforce
a loan contract and its repossession rights-just as important as
recognizing an owner's possession (and the repossession rights of a
secured creditor in the event of a default).95
2. Banks Structure Contracts that Enable Them to
Extract a Penalty from the Borrower, Without Resorting
to the Formal Legal System
When these bankers lend to the migrant poor, they are most
likely to pursue micro-credit programs. Micro-credit often has been
described as the only advance in lending that has succeeded in
expanding the availability of credit for the very poor on a macro-level.
The primary innovation of micro-credit programs is group lending:

92. This finding is also supported by Field & Torero, supra note 80, and Galiani &
Schargrodsky, supra note 80.
93. Hernando De Soto's work advocating titling programs among the developing-world poor
is the most well-known example of this approach. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF
CAPITALISM: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST, AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 196 (2000);
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM 158-72 (1989); see
also ROBERT COOTER & HANS-BERND SCHAEFER, LAW AND POVERTY OF NATIONS (2009), available
at http:/works.bepress.comrobertcooter/144; Paul G. Mahoney The Common Law and
Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 523 (2001) (discussing
different countries' property and contract rights); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal
Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1 (1998) (outlining
requirements for a nations' prosperity in terms of property and contract rights); Michael J.
Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for
Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 397 (2008) ('CThe conventional wisdom among economists and
development scholars is that strong formal property rights are a necessary precondition for
economic growth."). But see MARK GOODALE & SALLY E. MERRY, THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL (2007) (expressing doubts about
the faith other scholars have placed in asset-building as a strategy for poverty alleviation).
94. Field & Torero, supra note 80, at 29-30; Galiani & Schargrodsky, supra note 80, at 2425.
95. I do not mean to single out the importance of legal rules and a reliable legal system as
the most important reason for banks' reluctance to lend to the titled poor; there are a variety of
other rationales that might be offered for pervasive failures in credit markets for the poor. For a
comprehensive survey of the literature, see Robert Cull et al., Financial Performance and
Outreach:A GlobalAnalysis of LeadingMicrobanks, 117 ECON. J. F107 (2007).
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individuals without access to collateral form groups with the goal of
obtaining a loan. While loans are made individually to members of the
group, all of the members of the group will be denied access to future
borrowing if any individual borrower fails to repay. 96 This innovation
likely accounts for the consistently high repayment rates.
In accordance with the literature, some banker-interviewees
stressed the existence of social collateral as a substitute for physical
collateral, since those who are at risk of defaulting on their loans
suffer significant peer pressure and may even be stigmatized in the
larger community in the long-term if they eventually default.
However, all of the banker-interviewees emphasized that in the event
of a default they had minimal expectation of repayment. What
appeared attractive to these interviewees about micro-credit was that
peer monitoring provides a penalty that is sure and swift and that
does not require dependence on a legal system that may be unreliable
or inaccessible.
3. Relational Theories of Financing: Collateral as a
Strategic Threat
There is an extensive discussion in the legal scholarship of the
motivations of lenders and borrowers when considering whether to
engage in secured financing. Conventionally, collateral serves the
function of reducing the likelihood that borrowers will default in
circumstances where they can easily divert cash flows without the
knowledge of the lender.9 7 There is virtually nothing in the legal
scholarship as to how these conventional theories of secured lending
may apply to financing under conditions of pervasive informality.
However, this is a central theme in the development finance
literature, which converges with the legal scholarship on secured
lending in significant respects. 98 While the development finance
literature discusses several potential considerations that might affect
institutional lender behavior in this context, the key issue that is
repeatedly emphasized is the divertibility of cash flows. 99 In conditions
of informality, cash diversion is more likely to occur and more difficult

96. Notably, in most microlending programs, there is no formal or legal joint liability (i.e.,
group members are not legally obligated to repay the pro rata portion of a defaulting member).
See BEATRIZ ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE ECONOMICS OF
MICROFINANCE 70 (2005) (detailing liability schemes).

97. Id. at 21.
98. A good summary is included in Bond & Rai, supra note 34.
99. An excellent summary of this literature is in ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & MORDUCH,
supra note 96, intro.
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to detect. In response to these challenges, traditional financial
institutions have generally required collateral. 100
While the traditional view has been that lenders value the
right of liquidation in a secured transaction, this theory is less
The
plausible under these more informal circumstances.
aforementioned legal challenges present a de facto, if not de jure, bar
to a lender's ability to liquidate collateral. In this context, liquidation
rights are moot. Yet banks often insist on collateral as a condition of
lending to the poor. The question becomes: Why require collateral
from these borrowers? Of the rationales offered in the literature, those
that fall under the umbrella of indirect "relational" rationales seem
most applicable. 10 1 Relational theories are skeptical of the notion that
lenders pursue secured transactions because of direct enforcement
effects, such as liquidation rights. Rather, these theories emphasize
the borrower's behavior
that security has important indirect effects0 on
2
and incentives prior to the point of default.
In accordance with these theories, several banker-interviewees
emphasized that they value collateral because of the power that it
allows them to wield before the possibility of default even arises.
Specifically, they are able to curtail excesses of the borrower through
strategic threats against the collateral. Apparently, these threats are
credible even if the collateral is only notional because of the role that
threats play in sending signals to the larger community regarding the
making
health of a debtor's finances. In this manner, strategic threat
10 3
falls squarely into a "signaling" theory of secured lending.
Using collateral as a strategic threat seems particularly
applicable in the conditions of informality which characterize the
100. Id.
101. To the extent that these theories focus disproportionately on secured financing, I mean
to emphasize not the security, but rather the relational aspects of the theories.
102. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179,
2188-89 (1994) (citing the creditor's "power to punish the debtor"); David Gray Carlson, Secured
Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1635, 1679-80 (1998) (citing the importance
of power, as opposed to monitoring); Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in SmallBusiness Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-26 (1997) (arguing that for lenders to small businesses, the
ability to prevent borrowers from taking on future debt is a primary motivator for securing the
debt); Mann, supra note 48, at 2244-47 (arguing that for lenders to small businesses, the ability
to prevent borrowers from taking on future debt is a primary motivator for securing the debt);
Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1396, 141214 (1997) (arguing that firms issue secured debt to avert dilution of their claims by later
lenders); Scott, supra note 49, at 927-29 (1986) (suggesting that collateral has "hostage-like"
characteristics); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21
J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 245-47 (1992) (discussing the bank's leverage with the lender as an
important factor).
103. Triantis, supra note 102, at 241-43. While Triantis does not use the phrase in this
context, it seems particularly applicable.
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bottom of the pyramid. Typically, the poor depend heavily on their
communities. This is not coincidental, for in resource-constrained
to risk-pooling
are
indispensable
neighbors
circumstances,
arrangements. The poor are likely to depend on their neighbors for
risk-pooling arrangements, ranging from informal agricultural
insurance to communal herding grounds to savings clubs. For obvious
reasons, a person's fate is heavily intertwined with that of her
neighbors. 10 4 In such close-knit communities, it is difficult for a
borrower to keep private his difficulties with his bankers. Rural
Jamaican farmers are like the famous Ellicksonian ranchers' 05''gossip" appears to play an important role in mediating business
relations. A bank's threat to enforce a loan agreement provides a
signal to neighbors that the borrower is experiencing financial
difficulty.106
H. Visas as New "New Property"0o
Visa-as-collateral has been designed with the foregoing
emphasis on unconventional enforcement mechanisms in mind. The
important conceptual shift is a re-conceptualization of a visa as a
license, a quasi-property right with collateral-like characteristics. Why
think of a visa in this manner? If a visa can be thought of as property,
it is easier to conceptualize posting a bond for a visa.
1. The Reich Analogy and a Visa as a Franchise or a License
In a seminal article forty years ago, Charles Reich noted that
an increasing number of persons derived their wealth from their
relationships with the federal government. He identified a range of
benefits that derived from government largesse and famously named
08
them "the new property.'

104. See, e.g, Barr et al., supra note 78, at 25 (noting that co-group members curb their risktaking preferences to match their group).
105. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 15-28
(1991).
106. As Scott has so aptly put it, "in essence, relational security signals (to) other creditors
that a policeman is walking the beat, and thus they can relax their vigilance in taking individual
precautions." Scott, supra note 49, at 931.
107. The term is Blocher's play on Reich's term. See Blocher, supra note 35.
108. Like Reich, I utilize the term "property" not in the traditional Blackstonian sense that
generations of lawyers now associate with alienablity and "despotic" ownership, inter alia, but
rather, as the word "property" is utilized in a modern sense to refer to a more abstract and
complicated network of legal entitlements and obligations which serve not only narrow private
goals, but also promote larger public goals. See generally Reich, supra note 35.
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Specifically, Reich noted that public law entitlements were
increasingly fulfilling goals traditionally associated with private law
and a market economy (for example, providing millions of U.S. citizens
with their primary source of income). Visas, in fact, share several "new
property" characteristics. For example, like welfare benefits, although
visas were initially conceived as easily revocable privileges, they have
since evolved into instruments with property-like characteristics,
which in many instances are only revocable if the visa recipient is
provided with some due process. Like other forms of "new property,"
visas provide for their holders a certain legal status bestowed by
government, through which they can access a particular set of
economic benefits. While visas do not share traditional characteristics
of property as it conventionally has been understood (for example,
visas typically may not be bought or sold and are generally understood
to be categorically excluded from the market), in this manner, visas
are no different from other forms of "new property" such as
government-backed entitlements (for example, welfare benefits) that
are inalienable but nevertheless widely recognized to have propertylike characteristics.
Consider further a visa's analogy to a franchise or a license,
both prototypical examples of "new property." Although a visa would
not typically be thought of as either a franchise or a license, in fact, a
visa is deeply analogous to both. Indeed, U.S. visas may be described
as licenses to work in the United States. Like licenses, visas make it
possible for their recipients to engage in particular kinds of work. Like
other forms of licensees, visa holders are only able to receive what is
usually their primary source of income because they hold visas. Thus,
the "new property" analogy fits.
Further, like franchises, particular types of visas may be
conceptualized as partial monopolies. 10 9 Indeed, visas bear strong
analogies to partial monopolies in other arenas. 110 In part by limiting
their number, the government has made U.S. visas extremely
109. This analogy has been supported by electronic correspondence between the author and
Lant Pritchett, a leading economist on immigration. E-Mail from Lant Pritchett, Professor,
Harvard Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, to Eleanor Brown (Apr. 9, 2011, 11:05 AM EDT) (on file with
author). The franchise-like characteristics are clearly more applicable to particular categories of
visas. For example, if visa recipients are competing with a large pool of undocumented persons
once they arrive in the United States, the franchise-like characteristics of the visa are clearly
less applicable.
110. Indeed the partial monopoly argument has been used to buttress the distributive justice
concern, namely the view that requiring visas to work makes it costlier for poor people to fill jobs
which they desperately need and which have few natural barriers to entry. Lant Pritchett,
Professor, Harvard Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Remarks at Leveraging Migration for Africa, World
Bank (Mar. 30, 2011).
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remunerative for the lucky few who receive them."1 It is difficult to
dispute that visas create huge financial windfalls for recipients.
2. A Visa's Other Property-Like Characteristics: Reputation
Visas display another property-like characteristic as well.
Recent scholarship has contended that "reputation itself-social
status and the respect of others-can usefully be understood as a form
of property." 1 2 Sociological studies demonstrate that migration
confers reputational benefits on migrants in their communities of
origin. 113 Moreover, these reputational benefits extend to their
associates from their communities of origin, who may secure tangible
economic advantages from their associations with migrants. 114
Reputations, and the corresponding ability to monetize them,
may be augmented or diminished depending on whether migrants
111. This is particularly the case with respect to highly-skilled visas, which are usually
limited in number and whose holders usually command substantial compensation in the
marketplace. See Gates Tells Congress What Is Needed for Better Work Force, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 2008, at C7 (discussing testimony of Bill Gates on highly-skilled visas).
112. Blocher, supra note 35, at 120. The term "reputational property" generally has been
utilized with respect to intellectual property such as goodwill. However, unlike reputational
property without clear economic value (such as reputational property in the virtual world of
social networking sites), the reputational benefits conferred by visas are monetized in concrete
ways.
113, Anthropologist Nancy Foner's qualitative field research among Anglophone West Indian
migrants in New York supports this point. She finds that migrant women in particular
experience a considerable elevation in status in their families and communities of origin upon
migration, in large part because their increased earning power allows them to make significant
financial contributions to both their families and communities of origin. FONER, supra note 58 at
95-98 (2005) Moreover, she cites ethnographic studies in other migrant communities
demonstrating that female migrants in particular experience elevated status in their families
and communities of origin. Id. at 96-97 (citing Dominican and Salvadorian migrants, among
others, and asserting that they had experienced an elevation in status).
114. Qualitative field research among migrants demonstrates that when migrants from
certain communities achieve success, they build reputational capital from which future migrants
from the same community also benefit. Foner's study of Anglophone West Indian domestic
workers supports this point. See Foner, supra note 58, at 164 ("Once West Indian women
[migrants] got a toehold in domestic service, friends and relatives followed as social networks
passed along valuable information about how to find jobs .... [N]etwork hires inspire automatic
trust; employers feel that they can find someone reliable and trustworthy to look after their
children or an elderly parent through referrals ...")The experience of Cuban migrants is also
instructive. Cuban migrants have historically been understood in the Miami business community
to be good credit risks. Even when they lack start-up capital, their perceived solid reputations
have allowed them to enter certain forms of business in the United States for which there
typically have been high barriers to entry, even for native-born U.S. citizens. See Alejandro
Portes, The Social Origins of the Cuban Enclave Economy of Miami, 30 SOCIO. PERSP. 340, 363
(1987) (describing the practice of lending to Cuban immigrants, including those who lacked
collateral, on the basis of their business reputation and credit history in Cuba). See generally
Alejandro Portes & Leif Jensen, The Enclave and the Entrants:Patterns of Ethnic Enterprise in
Miami Before and After Mariel, 54 AM. SOCIO. REV. 929 (1989).
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remain providers for their families and communities of origin. There is
little doubt that simply by virtue of the poor countries and
communities from which they originate, migrants remain subject to
extreme credit rationing. 115 However, the interviews of Jamaican
migrant workers and professional lenders support other studies
indicating that visas confer reputational benefits that allow some
recipients to obtain credit that normally would not be available to
116
them.
To the extent that poor migrants are more likely to receive
credit than their similarly situated neighbors without visas, the
interviews indicate a continuum of rationales that might be offered for
this result. Notable among these rationales is that bank lending is at
least partly derivative of the reputational benefits associated with
visas. Banks appear more willing to extend credit if some external
entity has vetted the prospective borrower (although under this
proposal, the United States would also be relying on the banks' vetting
process.) Thus, a U.S. visa would constitute a signal that a reliable
authority has vetted its recipient. In this manner, a visa may fulfill
the role of more conventional due diligence, 117 such as credit reports,
which are typically unavailable in developing countries. Moreover,
migrant-borrowers already are likely to be high-status persons within
their communities who would suffer some reputational loss in the
18
event of a default.
115. This evidence comes from Bolivia, Mexico and the Commonwealth Caribbean. For a
brief background summary of the literature on credit-rationing among the poor in developing
countries, see Bose & Cothren, supra note 49, at 424-25 (observing that investors, particularly in
developing countries, face the prospect of credit-rationing, and a favored group of firms typically
enjoys access to the credit market at very low cost, while others must rely exclusively on
internally generated funds.) A good summary is included in the 1989 World Development Report
by the World Bank. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 3-4 (1989). For two other
works that provide excellent summaries, see generally KAUSHIK BASU, THE LESS DEVELOPED
ECONOMY: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORY (1984); James R. Tybout, Credit Rationing
and Investment Behavior in a Developing Country, 65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 598 (1983).
116. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing improved credit access for
Pakistani and Egyptian migrant farmers).
117. Indeed, one scholar argues that by effectively constraining defaults, the credit reporting
system actually has created collateral. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Human Worth as Collateral, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 793, 813 (2007).
118. My interviews with loan officers in the formal Jamaican banking sector who service the
poor supported these views. I identified a few banks that extend credit to migrants to fund costs
associated with the regularization or extension of their immigration status in the United States.
For example, two leading financial institutions in the Caribbean and Latin America have largescale programs to extend loans to migrants for the application and legal costs associated with
extending their '"Temporary Protected Status" ('TPS"). These financial institutions are JN, which
services Caribbean nationals, and Banco Pichincha, which services Latin American nationals,
particularly Ecuadorians. The Secretary of Homeland Security may designate the nationals of a
foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country's
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III. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN BENEFITS
A. Is This ProposalPoliticallyPlausible?
An observer reasonably might question the political plausibility
of visa-as-collateral on the grounds that the U.S. government would
essentially be conditioning visa renewal not on a breach of U.S. lawor even a breach of foreign law-but on compliance with private loan
contracts in a foreign jurisdiction to which the United States is not a
party."1 9 This skepticism is reasonable since in matters of
immigration, global distributive justice concerns have not typically
been a major concern for Congress. Rather, when making immigration
law, Congress traditionally has been motivated by labor needs and
economic concerns, and more recently, it appears to be motivated
increasingly by public discomfort with the national security
implications of the presence of a large number of unauthorized
persons in the United States. 120 Thus, the question becomes: Does this
proposal offer other institutional design benefits, which would make it
attractive to Congress? The purpose of this Section is to highlight such
benefits.
In conditions of information asymmetry, governments often
seek to identify private parties who have better access to information
to aid in their gatekeeping and enforcement functions. 121 Given the
weak institutional framework and pervasive informality in many
developing countries, the challenges of enlisting uncoordinated private
nationals from returning safely. Following the January 2010 earthquake, undocumented Haitian
nationals received TPS. See Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIG. SERV.,
http://www.uscis.gov/portallsite/uscis/ (follow 'Temporary Protected Status" hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 2, 2011).
119. It bears emphasizing that the issue is not one of legal permissibility; indeed, the INA
includes a dizzying array of bases for excluding aliens from the United States, which have been
routinely upheld by the courts even when they bear no clear relation to immigration policy goals.
See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 14, at 514-20, 544-89 (discussing a wide range of
deportability grounds, including immigration control, crime, and national security).
120. Id. at 4, 20, 69 (discussing economic development, national security, and labor needs,
respectively). Indeed, a recent report by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press
confirms that a majority of U.S. citizens want tougher enforcement of immigration laws and a
tough road to citizenship for those undocumented immigrants already in the country. See Scott
Keeter, Where the Public Stands on Immigration Reform, PEW RES. CTR., Nov. 23, 2009,
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1421/where-the-public-stands-on-immigration-reform.
121. See, e.g., Manns, supra note 15, at 889 ('The desirability of private gatekeepers turns on
the fact that the goods or services they supply or demand provide them with cost-effective
opportunities to detect and potentially prevent wrongdoing by customers or suppliers. For
example, lawyers and accountants may be well-positioned to detect fraud by their clients ... at
significantly lower economic and social costs than public enforcers. Enlisting these types of
private actors as public monitors of narrowly defined areas of wrongdoing may provide
").
governments with cost-effective ways to outsource enforcement functions ....
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actors as gatekeepers and enforcers may seem especially daunting.
However, there are several features of financial intermediaries that
make them appropriate candidates.
1. The Key Features of Financial Intermediaries to the Poor
Financial intermediaries know their clients well and play
critical roles in their daily lives. 122 Indeed, detailed ethnographic
studies of the spending habits of the poor in Bangladesh, India, and
South Africa found that a majority of respondents interacted with
informal financial intermediaries very regularly. 123 Researchers find a
dizzying range of financial intermediaries servicing the poor, including
deposit takers, money lenders, savings clubs, and rotating savings and
credit associations. In the absence of reliable financial recordkeeping,
informal financial intermediaries in developing countries must visit
their clients on almost a daily basis to ascertain their assets and
liabilities. Indeed, they know their clients so well that they give new
meaning to the term "community banker."
By leveraging their extensive access to on-the-ground
information, informal money lenders appear to have developed an
expertise in pricing risk in conditions of informality. Moreover, they
seem to be well hedged against down-side risk: through their
extensive networks, they are able to locate defaulters and collect
outstanding amounts. Indeed, they are paradigmatic hostage takers:
even if borrowers disappear, money lenders have access to relatives,
124
against whom they may make implicit and explicit threats.
As formal financial intermediaries have recognized the size of
the potential client base at the bottom of the pyramid, they too are
increasingly stepping into the lending market for the poor.125 Further,

122. See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 28, at 46, 58 (providing evidence in the context of
informal lending to the very poor).
123. Id. at 4, 46 (summarizing such research); see also STUART RUTHERFORD, THE PLEDGE:
ASA, PEASANT POLITICS, AND MICROFINANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANGLADESH 25-26, 33-

35 (2009) (discussing examples of informal finance in Bangladesh); Daryl Collins, Debt and
Household Finance:Evidence from the FinancialDiaries,25 DEV. S. AFR. 469, 477 (2008) (noting
that in South Africa, "informal finance can be crucial to poor households"); Daryl Collins, Social
Security and Retirement: Perspectives from the Financial Diaries 7-8 (Sept. 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.financialdiaries.com/files/Financial%20Diaries%20and%20
retirement%20-%20EDIT.pdf (discussing contact with an informal intermediary in South Africa).
124. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
125. Halady Satish Rao, Asian Development Bank, Welcome Remarks at Banking of the
Bottom of the Pyramid Conference (Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/
Speeches/2007/sp2007039.asp. Providing financial intermediation in the formal lending sector
will potentially have spillover effects. Moneylenders may provide credit, but they rarely offer a
gateway to other asset-building services, such as insurance, annuities, and so forth. As one
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they appear to be replicating the strategies of their informal
competitors. For example, rather than setting up formal branches,
they too provide branchless banking. Moreover, recognizing the
expertise of informal lenders in pricing local risks, when formal
financial institutions seek to increase their market share, they often
hire persons who were previously providers of informal financial
services. These persons typically are from local communities and have
26
pre-existing knowledge of potential clients.
Finally, as many developing countries have modified their
regulatory frameworks to create incentives for formal financial
intermediaries to service the poor, the market at the bottom of the
pyramid has become increasingly competitive. 127 As barriers to entry
fall and competition for making loans increases, lenders' business
reputations matter for recruiting potential clients. The preliminary
128
evidence is that consumers have benefited.
2. Financial Intermediaries as Gatekeepers and Policing
the Gatekeepers
The foregoing speaks to several key features of financial
intermediaries that make them appropriate gatekeepers. 29 First,
banker pointed out in his interview, informal money lenders are not in a position to execute
contracts with reinsurers! Indeed, studies of the clients of the most famous microcredit
institution, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, have confirmed that once the poor begin to access
credit, they simultaneously gain access to health, agricultural and funeral insurance, and
retirement accounts, among other services that have heretofore been unattainable. See
ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 96.
126. Gautam Ivatury & Ignatio Mas, The Early Experience with Branchless Banking 11
(Consultative Grp. to Assist the Poor (CGAP), Working Paper No. 26, Apr. 2008) ('The informal
financial service providers that many poor people use are also largely founded on human
interaction and personal or community relationships."); see also Branchless Banking Country
Diagnostics,CGAP, http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rcl.11.1772/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2011)
(discussing studies of branchless banking in Brazil, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Phillipines,
Jordan, Argentina, Columbia, South Africa, India, El Salvador, and Mexico).
127. Rao, supra note 125. We have seen more significant forays into extending formal
financial services to the poor in markets where the bottom of the pyramid is so large that it can
mitigate the misgivings of financial institutions about servicing this segment of the population.
These include markets such as India and Brazil (as opposed to much smaller markets such as
Jamaica). See PRAHALAD, supra note 32, at 125-28, 193-4 (discussing Brazilian banking and
Indian salt distribution ventures, which both target poor markets).
128. JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., RETHINKING BANK REGULATION: TILL ANGELS GOVERN (2006).

129. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308-09 (2004) (defining gatekeepers as
"reputational intermediar[ies]"); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 63
(2003) (defining gatekeepers as parties who "offer a service ... that is necessary for clients
wishing to ... engage in certain activities"); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer:

Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of FinancialInstitutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019,
1050 (1993) (noting that gatekeepers often provide "indispensable" services); Kraakman, supra
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recall that the information needed to assess the trustworthiness of a
potential migrant is hyper-local; it is difficult to access or evaluate exante predictors of reliability on a nonlocal level. Notably, screening
and monitoring already are core competencies of lenders; they must
perform this service well to stay in business. In the conditions of
informality that are pervasive in the countries from which poor
migrants typically originate, banks who now service the poor must
force the convergence of the formal and the informal. They typically
draw on a range of informal networks on the ground to closely
scrutinize potential clients. These are precisely the hyper-local
networks that the United States typically has not been able to
penetrate to gather information on visa applicants. Thus, these banks
constitute ideal "gatekeepers."
Second, formal lenders are providing indispensable (or nearindispensable) services. They play a critical income-smoothing
function, allowing the poor to transform irregular income streams into
smoother resource flows. As formal financial intermediation becomes
more standard in poor communities, bankers will become less difficult
to replace, particularly if they crowd out their informal competitors
through good service and competitive pricing.
Third, as formal players, reputational integrity should be
important to their businesses. Theoretically, if they operate within a
regulatory structure, they receive minimal (or negative) payoff for
breaking the law. In this sense, they are essentially reputational
intermediaries.
If the banks become the gatekeepers, who will police the
gatekeepers? The potential rent-seeking problems are apparent in
that without external oversight, loan officers will have powerful
incentives to choose from among a group of qualified applicants those
who are willing to offer bribes. A loan officer still may be able to keep
the loan default rate of her clients low, thus assuring that she will
retain her position and earn some extra income in the process. So, she
might figure, why not take a bribe? Indeed, there is evidence of
extensive rent seeking among loan programs for the rural poor in
developing countries, particularly when the loans are backed by
government guarantees. 130 Thus, the foregoing proposal is contingent
on the existence of a robust regulatory system-absent from many

note 48, at 53 (noting that gatekeepers "are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their
cooperation").
130. Richard L. Meyer & Geetha Nagarajan, Rural Finance: Recent Advances and Emerging,
Lessons, Debates, and Opportunities 76 (Dep't of Agric., Envtl., & Dev. Econ., Ohio State Univ.,
Working Paper No. AEDE-WP-0041-05, 2005).
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developing countries from which guest workers originate-in which
banks are overseen by some external entity.131
For obvious reasons, it is difficult for the United States to
influence rulemaking and enforcement on the ground in a developing
country; however, a larger benefit may exist that dwarfs all other
benefits from a developmental perspective. The United States may
seek to instigate a "race to the top," encouraging the
institutionalization of regulatory best practices in developing
countries, by insisting that it will only accept bonds underwritten by
lenders who operate in countries that meet certain standards of
regulation.
The United States should also insist that banks achieve certain
levels of effectiveness in their screening processes. Consider the
following: If a guest worker overstays but continues to service the
loan, what incentive does the bank have to get the worker to leave the
United States? An illegal immigrant might just pay off the loan,
essentially to "buy off' the bank. In the worst case scenario, one might
envision certain banks whose clients have such high rates of visa
overstay that the banks essentially become facilitators of
undocumented migration. To avoid this problem, the U.S. government
must penalize banks that lend to too many visa violators by refusing
to accept their bonds. 132
The bottom line is that when banks cannot count on rules, they
make deals with individual borrowers. 133 By borrowing against a U.S.
131. Ruth De Krivoy, Reforming Bank Supervision in Developing Countries, in BUILDING AN
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 113, 113 (Eric Rosengren and John Jordan eds.,

2000). Some researchers have argued that regulating financial disclosure requirements is the
most effective contributor to banking development and protecting poor savers and borrowers in
particular. See BARTH ET AL., supra note 128, at 255 (highlighting the effectiveness of information
disclosure). See generally Laura Brix and Katharine McKee, Consumer Protection Regulation in
Low Access Environments: Opportunities to Promote Responsible Finance (2010), available at
http://www.cgap.orglgm/document-1.9.42343/FN60.pdf
(highlighting
the
importance
of
information disclosure particularly for poor borrowers).
132. Of course, it takes "two to tango," so the United States should also tweak its own
policies to discourage visa overstay, even as it attempts to influence bank policies. For example,
this proposal will work best if those who abide by the terms of their visa have some reasonable
prospect of visa renewal once they return to their home countries. Visa renewal will essentially
become a "reward" for good behavior (along with the United States returning the bond) and
provide a further disincentive for guest workers to disappear into the underground economy.
Indeed, several European Union countries have committed to renewing the visas of low-skilled
workers who return home for precisely this reason. See Patrick Weil, All or Nothing? What the
United States Can Learn from Europe as it Contemplates Circular Migration and Legalization
for Undocumented Immigrants 6 (Apr. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct-publication-attachments/GMF7610_TM_Weil_fnal.pdf
(discussing such a program for seasonal workers in Italy).
133. Cf. Hallward-Driemeier et al., supra note 37, at 3 (discussing the prevalence of deals
over rules for firms in Africa and how this creates costly uncertainty).
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visa, migrants will be in essence signing onto a U.S.-influenced 'loan
default equals visa default" rule in the local market. If borrowers
service their loans within this rule-bound framework, banks will have
positive institutional experiences with poor borrowers. Such
experiences will allow banks to create actuarial tables calculating
risks, and thereby encourage the growth of a market in visa-ascollateral lending. Additionally, if the United States insists on this
rule-bound framework for participating local banks, local regulators
will have an incentive to tighten their rules, and banks will abide by
the local regulatory framework. Thus, the visa-as-collateral proposal
may help to accelerate a developing nation's transition (even
interstitially) from an inefficient, deal-based, opaque system of lending
to a more efficient, rule-based, transparent system of lending to the
poor. 134
B. The Enforcement Question
1. Migration's Network Nature and the Difficulty of Enforcement
A central tenet of the economic sociology of immigration is that
migration is sustained by a dense web of interlocking ethnic networks
that operate transnationally. Studies have demonstrated that the key
factor in sustaining undocumented migration is the presence of thick
cross-border ethnic networks that facilitate migration and enable the
135
integration of migrants even when they lack documentation.
Unsurprisingly, these same transnational networks facilitate the
incorporation of persons who previously have been documented. When
134. Indeed, there is evidence that the Grameen model has had precisely this effect in
Bangladesh. See ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 96, at 85 (noting that because
repayment of Grameen loans occurs in public, "the process [is] more transparent and . . .
villagers know who among them is moving forward and who may be running into difficulties").
135. See Portes, supra note 58, at 22-23 (highlighting the importance of ethnic networks in
sociological studies of immigration and their ability to facilitate the transition from unauthorized
to legal immigration status). The landmark work in this regard has been conducted by Douglas
Massey at the Office of Population Research at Princeton University, who has analyzed Mexican
migratory patterns over the last century. See, e.g., Michael B. Aguilera & Douglas S. Massey,
Social Capitaland the Wages of Mexican Migrants: New Hypotheses and Tests, 82 Soc. FORCES
671, 671-72 (2003) (briefly summarizing Massey's and others' work on cross-border migrant
networks). Other scholars have conducted research which highlight the importance of crossborder networks. See, e.g., DAVID KYLE, TRANSNATIONAL PEASANTS: MIGRATIONS, NETWORKS,
AND ETHNICITY IN ANDEAN ECUADOR 198 (2000) (making same point in relation to Ecuadorian
migration); CECILIA MENJIVAR, FRAGMENTED TIES: SALVADORAN IMMIGRANT NETWORKS IN
AMERICA 74, 231-33 (2000) (Salvadoran migration); Nestor P. Rodriguez & Jaqueline Maria
Hagan, Maya Urban Villagers in Houston: The Formation of a Migrant Community from San
Cristobal Totonicapan, in THE MAYA DIASPORA: GUATEMALAN ROOTS, NEW AMERICAN LIVES 207
(James Loucky & Marilyn Moors eds., 2000) (Guatemalan migration).
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persons become undocumented, these networks provide false
documentation and facilitate their placement into jobs. Thus,
migrants are generally incorporated into economic and social networks
with relative ease and minimal costs, irrespective of their legal
status. 136 Notably, all of these networks are quintessentially private.
Even when public officials charged with enforcement have informal
ties to these networks, they generally are unable to penetrate them to
enforce immigration laws. 137 Moreover, even when they succeed in
penetrating these networks and conduct raids in the communities,
138
they generally incur extraordinary social and economic costs.
For example, although polling data shows that a majority of
U.S. citizens express concern about ineffective immigration
enforcement in the abstract, when enforcement actually occurs, it is
often controversial. Public enforcers find that they incur the wrath not
only of the targets of the raid, but also of a range of religious,
business, and nongovernmental actors. 139 Such immigration raids
undermine "communal efficacy" as persons who have historically
played critical roles in families and the broader community are
displaced. 40 Essentially, some have argued that forced deportation as

136. Cf. Portes, supra note 58, at 22 (noting that such networks act as "social bridges" that
decrease costs and risks of immigration, and citing evidence that many immigrants obtain legal
immigrant status via these networks).
137. See Manns, supra note 15, at 934-35 (noting that it is "extremely difficult for
enforcement officials to oversee and to close off channels for illegal immigration").
138. See Robert Hildreth, Commentary, ICE Immigration Raids Waste Time and Money,
NEW AM. MEDIA, Dec. 26, 2008, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/viewarticle.html?
article-id=3823e62e972ef6fec715fe8298a3045e (noting that a raid on an Iowa meat-packing
plant cost roughly $14,000 per immigrant seized); see also Editorial, Stop the Raids, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2007, at A28, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10O4/opinion/04thur2.html
(noting that immigration agents have "set off waves of fear and outrage, not only among illegal
immigrants, but among citizens whose privacy and security they have violated, through
unchecked aggression, carelessness and incompetence").
139. See Nina Bernstein, Church's Compact with U.S. Spares Immigrants Detention, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009, at Al (raids spur church opposition); Julia Preston, Employers Fight Tough
Measures on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2008, at Al (finding that local businesses are
banding together to voice their concerns regarding the negative implications of stringent
immigration enforcement for business); Monica Rhor, AP Impact: Immigration Raids Split
Families, Bos. GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2007, at A9, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/
(raids
spur
massachusetts/articles/2007/03/l1/ap-impact-immigrationraidssplit_families/
church opposition); see also Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 36 (pointing out that local businesses benefit from the consumption of
products and services by undocumented migrants, and conversely, these firms lose business
when undocumented migrants leave).
140. There has been ethnographic work documenting the disruptive effect of forced
deportation on families and communities. See Jacqueline Hagan, Karl Eschbach & Nester
Rodriguez, U.S. Deportation Policy, Family Separation and Circular Migration, 42 INT. MIG.
REv. 64 (2008).
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a cure may be worse than the disease. 14 1 Through encouraging selfdeportation, which is likely to be perceived as less punitive, visa-ascollateral may provide a better alternative.
2. Financial Intermediaries May Be Motivated to Find
Noncompliant Aliens
This Section discusses further institutional innovations that
would better enable banks to extract penalties when aliens default on
their bonds and thus increase the likelihood that noncompliant aliens
will be excluded with minimal involvement from public enforcers. The
key feature of a visa-bonding system is that the bond will be forfeited
if the alien becomes noncompliant with the conditions of the visa.
Indeed, in Singapore, where bonding systems are also regularly
utilized, the bond is generally forfeited in its entirety once the alien
becomes noncompliant. 142 In contrast to this approach, the proposal
herein advocates a system of "staged" or "tiered" forfeiture.
The first institutional design innovation is that even if an alien
is noncompliant with the visa's conditions, the bank should be able to
recoup a significant proportion of the bond upon providing evidence
that the alien in fact has left the United States. It is critical that the
window of opportunity to recoup the bond be limited. A network
theory of immigration tells us that undocumented aliens become
enmeshed more thoroughly in social networks if they are out of status
for long periods and thus become more difficult to find, so it is crucial
143
that banks find them quickly.
Thus, the second novel feature of this proposal is that the
"tiering" of bond forfeiture should be indexed to the speed with which
the bank is able to provide evidence that the alien has left the United

141. See Rhor, supra note 139, at 54 (citing several advocates arguing that forced deportation
should be reconsidered as a strategy since it undermines the integrity of families and
communities). This position is also held by influential NGOs, who have been particularly critical
of state and local law enforcement cooperation in efforts to identify noncompliant aliens because
of the potential disruptions that deportations pose to families and communities. See, e.g., LEGAL
MOMENTUM, THE 287(G) PROGRAM: HARMING IMMIGRANT WOMEN (2010), available at http://www.

legalmomentum.org/our-worklgender-equity-and-gender-bias/reports-and-resources/the-287gprogram-harming-immigrant-women.pdf; Steve Dinnen, How an Immigration Raid Changed a
Town, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 31, 2009, at 17 (noting severe consequences for local
business following a large immigration raid and subsequent deportations); Detention and
Deportation in the Age of ICE, AM. CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MASS. http://www.aclum.org/ice
(last visited Apr. 2 2011).
142. See AGUNIAS & NEWLAND, supra note 7; BODVARSSON & VAN DEN BERG, supra note 7.
143. See generally Portes, supra note 58 (discussing how immigrants are easily enmeshed in
local networks).
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States. That is, the proportion of the bond that the bank can recoup
could be tied to the speed of self-deportation.
One approach would be to legalize a bail-bondsman status for
banking companies. 144 Of course, bail bondsmen are already widely
utilized in the criminal law context; they have significant powers to
apprehend individuals who violate the terms of their bond and flee the
authorities. 145 This approach would undoubtedly be controversial.
Indeed, enlisting the support of the immigration bar in
institutionalizing such a bail-bondsman proposal would be dependent
on the successful importation of protections that have been developed
for defendants in the criminal law context into the immigration
context. 146 As applied in the immigration context, bankers (and their
agents) would be given the right to apprehend visa overstayers and
turn them over to the authorities. The key advantage bankers may
have is the ability to engage in superior information gathering. This
incentive to apprehend visa overstayers would be especially powerful
if the government returned to the bank some percentage of the bond
that would otherwise be forfeited, in the event that the bank can
successfully apprehend the visa overstayer.
3.

Mitigating the Risks of "Snitching"

Banks will typically be better than the government at accessing
hyper-local information on noncompliant aliens, irrespective of the
mechanism of enforcement. But there is an additional advantage of
the proposed system in that the bank's enforcement function differs in
a critical way from the classic gatekeeper function. Typically, in the
event of wrongdoing, gatekeepers provide evidence that allows the
government to fulfill the ultimate enforcement function. "Snitching,"
therefore, is a quintessential gatekeeper role. However, in this
instance, rather than "snitching," the gatekeeper may fulfill the

144. The analogies to the current system of bail bondsmen in the criminal justice system are
evident. For a good summary of the bail bond system, see STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J.
CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7.III.C, at 936 (2007).

145. Id. Indeed, institutional design innovations to curtail abuses by bail bondsmen may
also be appropriate in this context. See All Things Considered: Behind the Bail Bond System
(NPR radio broadcast Jan. 21-22, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=122954677 (discussing charges of abuses by bail bondsmen). The American Bar
Association has standards concerning pretrial release that include institutional innovations to
aid in the regulation of bail bondsmen. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL
RELEASE § 10-5.4 (3d ed. 2002), availableat http://www.pretrial.org/Docs/Documents/2.1.5.-ABA_

STANDARDS_ONPRETRIAL_RELEASE.pdf.
146. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 144, at 936.
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ultimate enforcement function by encouraging the wrongdoers to selfdeport.
While snitches (or private informants) are utilized regularly to
supplement public enforcement, snitching may have negative spillover
effects, particularly in poor, urban communities where migrants are
disproportionately likely to reside. 147 In the criminal justice context,
snitching may augment distrust of law enforcement officials. 148 This
distrust also likely exists in the immigration context, since persons are
unlikely to distinguish between immigration enforcement officials and
law enforcement more generally. Moreover, snitching may undermine
interpersonal relationships in communities and generally threaten the
social organization of a community, that is, the web of social
relationships that sustain its coherence. 149 Thus, the ideal scenario
would be for gatekeepers to accomplish the enforcement function
without snitching.
IV. THE COMMODIFICATION CRITIQUE
A. Background: Levmore's Puzzle
Consider two migrants who represent opposite loci on the
immigration continuum. "Sanjay," a Harvard-trained Indian national
is a wealthy Google shareholder. 50 He obtained his visa through a
highly competitive process partly on the basis of a commitment to
make a job-generating business investment in the United States. 151
His visa may be revocable if he does not meet these conditions. A
second immigrant, "Ambrosio," is a Guatemalan construction worker
who also makes a financial investment to gain U.S. labor market
access. 152 He pools his family's meager resources to make a down
payment to a coyote. 153 Not only does the coyote arrange Ambrosio's

147. See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 650 (2004).
148. Id.
149. The playwright Arthur Miller recognized this risk decades ago. These risks are

discussed in John Lahr's review of Arthur Miller's seminal play "A View from the Bridge". See
John Lahr, Devil in the Flesh, NEW YORKER, Feb. 1, 2010, at 78-79; cf. Robert J. Sampson,
Stephen W. Raudenbush & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study
of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 918-24 (1997) (surveying residents in Chicago and
finding that measures of collective efficacy are associated with variations in violence).
150. The "Sanjay" example is taken from Matt Richtel, Remade in America: Tech Recruiting
Clashes with ImmigrationRules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2009, at Al.
151. Id.
152. The "Ambrosio" example is taken from Jordan, supra note 85.
153. Id.
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clandestine cross-border travel, he also serves as an informal banker,
providing a 'loan" to fund transportation costs (at least in the form of
deferred payment arrangements). 154
Given a worldwide population of people with resources who are
willing to pay for access to the U.S. labor market, the INA embodies
the sentiment that it is appropriate to extract value (either in skills or
capital) from those who seek visas. 155 Having incurred significant
financial costs, the prospective migrant agrees to abide by certain
rules and incurs the risk of visa revocation if she does not meet her
commitments. The prospective migrant also may face a financial
penalty in the form of costs that she cannot recoup.
Herein lies the bifurcation in treatment that is illustrative of
an uneasy consensus. 156 Migrants are regularly allowed to "put their
money where their mouth is" at the top of the pyramid: Sanjay is a
prototype of such elite access. Contrast this situation with that of
Ambrosio, a prototypical immigrant at the bottom of the pyramid;
given the astronomical expenses Ambrosio incurs to cross the
border,157 it is reasonable to assume that he, too, would be willing to
pay to gain access to a temporary guest-worker visa, the only visa
category to which he is likely to have legal access given his low skill
base. However, there is no such option available to him.
Saul Levmore has characterized as a "puzzle" the general
disinclination of political elites-who already resort to the market to
allocate visas (as in the case of Sanjay)-to simultaneously finance
58
purchases (for the Ambrosios of the world) to expand demand.1
Levmore theorized that terms easily could be reached which could
satisfy both the expansionist instincts of those who support more open
borders and the restrictionist instincts of those who fear the economic,
154. Id.
155. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (2006) (providing for visas to be issued to immigrants who
invest at least one million dollars in a start-up business that generates full-time jobs for ten
United States citizens or lawful residents, generally known as "E" Treaty Investor Visas). While
E visas made up only 0.6 percent of all nonimmigrant visas issued in 2009 and 2010, they are
routinely issued. Indeed, over 34,000 E visas were issued in 2009 and over 36,000 in 2010. See
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, CLASSES OF NON-IMMIGRANTS ISSUED

VISAS, FISCAL YEARS 1992-2010, http://www.travel.state.gov/pdfIMultiYearTableXVI.pdf; see also
§ 1153(b)(1)(A)-(B) (providing for visas to be issued to immigrants of "extraordinary ability" or
who are "outstanding' with a significant likelihood of making innovative contributions to the
U.S. economy); § 1153(b)(2) (providing for visas to be issued to immigrants with advanced
academic training or who possess "exceptional ability).
156. My thanks to Douglas Massey for highlighting to me the bifurcation in treatment of the
Sanjays and Ambrosios of the world.
157. See Jordan, supranote 85.
158. Saul Levmore, Lecture, Unconditional Relationships, 76 B.U. L. REV. 807, 812-14
(1996).
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social, and cultural implications of long-term commitments to new
migrants.
This Article's advocacy of a visa bonding system coupled with a
reconceptualization of visa-as-collateral may be viewed as one attempt
to map out such terms. By raising the costs of noncompliance and
lowering overstay rates, bonding systems may expand U.S. labor
market access, particularly for poor migrants. Thus, it addresses the
concerns of the expansionists by making it possible for more persons
to enter, albeit temporarily. It simultaneously addresses the concerns
of restrictionists, given its emphasis on visa compliance so as to
preclude short-term guests from becoming long-term residents. I end
with a brief reflection on one deeply held potential source of discomfort
with "visa-as-collateral," namely the "commodification concern."
Indeed, this provides a primary rationale for the persistence and
vexing nature of Levmore's puzzle.
B. Critiquesof Market-Based Approaches
'Visa-as-collateral" reasonably might be grouped with a range
of proposals that are "market-based" approaches to immigration.
Market-based approaches share in common a critical approach to the
traditional view of the government as the best arbiter of who should
receive a visa. Rather, they assert, access to first-world labor markets
should be available to those applicants who, having met certain
eligibility requirements, are willing to pay a market-based price.
These "market-based" approaches have been subject to a range
of critiques that broadly fall under the anti-commodification heading.
Commodification criticisms usually are based on the moral intuition
that a monetary value should not be attached to membership in the
body politic that is conferred to citizens. 15 9 The same moral intuition
extends to affiliation with the body politic as a visa recipient, since
even temporary affiliation with the body politic carries certain rights
and responsibilities. 160 Moreover, since many citizens originally were
temporary visa recipients, temporary visas often signify a special

159. Michael J. Sandel is a prominent proponent of this view. See Michael J. Sandel, What
Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, in 21 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES
89 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2000); see also RADIN, supra note 38, at 152-70 (critiquing the sale of
citizenship); SHAcHAR, supra note 17, at 54-58 (same); Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability,100 HARV.L. REV. 1849, 1870-87 (1987) (same).
160. See Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case For Open Borders, 49 REV. POL.
251, 251-73 (1987). For an opposing view, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31-63 (1983).
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affiliation with the polity and, in many cases, the first step on a path
to citizenship.
These commodification critiques rely heavily on traditional
accounts of political membership or affiliation, which typically treat
citizenship, and even the lesser affiliations with the polity of a visa
recipient, as a bundle of rights-a source of identity or an inalienable
legal status. Given these background philosophical underpinnings, it
is not surprising that market-based mechanisms of allocation of either
citizenship or visas are anathema to anti-commodificationists. The
primary purpose of this Part is to address the commodification
critique.
C. Visa-as-CollateralDiffers in Critical Ways from Traditional
Market-Based Proposals
Traditional market-based approaches to immigration share an
emphasis on allocating visas to the aliens who would benefit most
from visas and to the aliens who would be most highly valued by U.S.
citizens. The logic of selling citizenship represents the functioning of a
global market for a particular factor of production, that is, human
capital, which will gravitate to places where its contribution is
greatest. Some economists advocate selling citizenship as a rationing
mechanism in which the entry price would be set to maximize
aggregate income for the native population. 16' Others advocate an
auction to the highest bidders, while some economists would limit the
auction to pre-qualified applicants. 162 Still others advocate proposals
combining traditional and market-based approaches, whereby
admission is granted to some, utilizing traditional criteria (that is,
according to qualifications), and to others according to their
163
willingness to pay.
There is a critical distinction between visa-as-collateral and
these market-based approaches. Visa-as-collateral advocates a "soft"
utilization of market approaches to accomplish entirely different goals.
The point of this proposal is not to allocate visas to the highest-value
161. JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 9-11 (1989).
162. Gary S. Becker, An Open Door for Immigrants-The Auction, Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1992,
at A14.
163. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 208-20 (2004). For broader general
discussions of market-based approaches to immigration, see generally Howard Chang, The
Economic Analysis of Immigration Law, in MIGRATION THEORY: TALKING ACROSS DISCIPLINES
205 (Caroline Brettell & James Hollifield, eds., 2000); Michael J. Trebilcock, Immigration Policy,
in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 259 (Peter Newman ed., 1998);
Michael J. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics of ImmigrationPolicy, 5 AM. LAW & ECON. REV.
271 (2003).
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users (although this might be a side effect of the policy). Rather, the
purpose is facilitative, namely, to accomplish the important goal of
mitigating information asymmetry challenges regardless of the
potential migrant's skills or ability to pay the highest price for a visa.
Yet irrespective of one's beliefs regarding the goals of
immigration law, 164 it is generally agreed that current methods of U.S.
visa allocation fail to accomplish goals that are fundamental to any
successful immigration policy. That is, the present system does not
adequately meet the first-order policy goals of the United States, such
as recruiting skilled persons or meeting labor-market shortages for
low-skilled persons.
Although this proposal does not advocate the allocation of visas
to the highest-value users, I recognize that my position implicates
many of the underlying sentiments against commodification. Anticommodification critics undoubtedly would argue that this proposal
would disadvantage those who are knowledge-poor, network-poor, or
cash-poor. These persons are disproportionately located at the bottom
of the pyramid.
D. The Official, Public, and Academic Postures:
Noncom modification
With rare exceptions, the official posture of the U.S.
government is one of noncommodification in immigration. This is
evidenced, in part, by the public pronouncements of immigration
policymakers and explains why, despite empirical evidence from other
countries of the potential benefits of auction systems, 165 both primary
and secondary markets for visas have received very little traction in
U.S. policymaking circles. Even in the current global economic crisis,
in which other countries have auctioned visas to investors as a

164. Even setting aside the debate surrounding the propriety of market-based approaches,
there is of course a deeply contentious debate as to what the goals of U.S. immigration law
should be. Scholars have identified a range of goals including demography, assimilation, family
reunification, and wealth creation. The question of which goals should be optimized is, of course,
deeply dependent on background normative commitments. Peter Schuck has reasonably pointed
out that these normative commitments often do not provide sufficient guidance in resolving
critical policy debates. Peter H. Schuck, The Morality of Immigration Policy, 45 SAN DIEGO L.

REV. 865, 866 (2008).
165. See, e.g., Don J. DeVoretz, An Auction Model of Canadian Temporary Immigration for
the 21st Century 5-13 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 1807, 2005) (raising the
potential benefits of an auction system in Canada).
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mechanism of jump-starting declining sectors of their economies, the
166
United States has remained resistant to such an approach.
This official posture of noncommodification coincides with
polling data on this issue, which show that a majority of U.S. citizens
oppose proposals to auction visas. The rationales offered by those
polled mirror the anti-commodification rationales in the academic
literature: visas, to the extent that they signify potential access to
citizenship, are understood by U.S. citizens to be quintessentially
public assets, 167 in part because even if visas only allow temporary
affiliation, many applicants overstay and later receive amnesties that
permit them to become citizens. Thus, the receipt of a visa often
signifies the first stage on a path to citizenship, and for this reason,
selling visas often is equated with selling access to a quintessentially
public asset. Indeed, visas might even be referred to as "public goods,"
although this is clearly an unconventional utilization of the term.
Analysts of polling data suggest that the public's resistance to
commoditizing visas arises in part from what students of cultural
cognition and behavioral economics have called a "framing
problem." 168 Thus, even when confronted with evidence demonstrating
the potential value of auctions in resolving immigration dilemmas,
166. Friedman, supra note 3. Indeed, the United States has arguably been moving in
precisely the opposite direction by cutting back on programs which allocate visas based on skill
or high investment levels. For example, the H-1 visa program for highly trained migrants may
suffer cuts. Moreover, financial institutions, which have received subsidies through the Troubled
Assets Relief Program (TARP), face greater scrutiny when they hire highly skilled aliens. Moira
Herbst, H-1B: Buy American Comes to TARP, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2009,
see
http://www.businessweek.com/blogs/money-politics/archives2009/02/h.lb-visas-buy.html;
also Alistair Barr, Wells Told Employees It May Cut Foreign Workers, WALL ST. J.
MARKETWATCH

(Mar. 31,

2009),

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/wells-told-staff-may-cut-

foreigners.
167. Political scientists utilize the term "framing effect" to account for the inclination of
individuals to take positions on an issue depending on the extent to which they prioritize certain
considerations. A classic example is residents' attitudes towards the efforts of a controversial
group known for hate speech to hold a rally in their town. If a leading newspaper editorial
characterizes the issue largely in terms of free speech, residents may support the rally. However,
if a newspaper editorial characterizes the issue in terms of public safety, they may come to a
different position. Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, FramingPublic Opinion in Competitive
Democracies, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 637 (2007); see also James Druckman & Kjersten Nelson,
Framing and Deliberation, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI, 728 (2003); Thomas Nelson & Zoe Oxley, Issue
FramingEffects and Belief Importance and Opinion, 61 J. POL. 1040 (1999). "Framing" appears
to be a primary concern for Shaheen Borna and James Stearns, who utilize it to explain the low
likelihood that access to the United States will be commoditized. See generally Shaheen Borna &

James M. Stearns, The Ethics and Efficacy of Selling National Citizenship, 37 J. Bus. ETHICS,
193, 193-207 (2002). Notably, they do not utilize the precise political science language of
"framing" (perhaps because they are not political scientists). This appears to be an instance in
which framing is important.
168. Chong & Druckman, supra note 167; Druckman & Nelson, supra note 167; Nelson &
Oxley, supranote 167.

2011]

VISA AS PROPERTY

1103

social-psychological processes lead individuals to assimilate evidence
in a manner that is consistent with pre-existing cultural frames that
are dominant in the political marketplace. 169 These cultural frames
are hostile to a market-based approach in the context of immigration,
and thus the average U.S. voter is unlikely to endorse utilizing the
170
market as a primary method of visa allocation.
E. Tragic Choice Framework
Calabresi and Bobbitt argue that a primary challenge in
society is "to make allocations in ways that preserve the moral
foundations of social collaboration."1 71 Their book is entitled Tragic
Choices, to capture the idea that choices regarding the allocation of
scarce goods inevitably will breach some deeply held societal values.
They draw a distinction between first-order and second-order
allocation decisions, with the former relating to how much of a scarce
good will ultimately be produced, and the latter relating to who will
get the goods.
They argue that societies generally keep these decisions
separate, with each level of decisionmaking preserving a different mix
of values. We keep the levels separate to preserve the illusion that
none of society's values have been disregarded. This shifting trajectory
172
of decisionmaking is characterized as a series of "subterfuges"
intended to shield the allocational decisionmaking, or "tragic choices,"
from public view. A legal subterfuge is a device that accomplishes a
desirable end while masking the methodology that produced the end.
Subterfuges are "useful-if dangerous-lie[s]" 73 that we use to cope
with "tragic choices.' 7 4
There is clearly an analogy in the immigration arena to this
modus operandi: while the official U.S. posture is one of
noncommodification, both current and historical policy reflects
significant concessions to commodification. One scholar argues that
even a cursory view of U.S. immigration history supports the view
that persons have traditionally "paid" very high prices to obtain the
right to enter the United States. 175 For example, as noted in the
"Sanjay" example above, under current U.S. immigration law, persons
169. See sources cited supra note 168.
170. See sources cited supra note 168.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 1.
The term "subterfuge" is Calabresi's. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 60.
Id. CALABRESI & BOBBITr, supranote 1, at 26, 78, 195--96.
Calabresi, supranote 1, at 60.
See Zolberg, supranote 16.
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seeking to obtain legal permanent residency under certain sections of
the INA may be obligated to invest at least one million dollars and
employ at least ten U.S. residents, and their status may be revoked if
they do not meet these commitments. 176 Moreover, there are also
concessions to commodification at the margins. One might call these
"unofficial subterfuges," as a cottage industry has developed with
brokers and coyotes charging applicants high fees to gain entry to the
United States. Notably, these fees are pervasive, not only in the
underground markets, but also in the formal markets, since elite
applicants typically employ attorneys who charge high fees to navigate
the complexities of the INA. Recent investigative reporting has
uncovered instances of aliens employing lobbyists to intercede on their
behalf with congressional staff, who in turn intercede on their behalf
with the immigration authorities.
However, since the government is not the beneficiary of these
fees charged, we are more concerned with "official subterfuges."
Concerns about "selling" visa access are surmountable when dealing
with candidates like "Sanjay" above, who constitute a tiny pool of very
privileged applicants operating above-board in a transparent
marketplace. However, we become much more concerned about the
sale of visa access as we approach the bottom of the pyramid-when
considered in the context of the acute poverty of visa applicants from
the developing world, selling visas too obviously contradicts anticommodification values held by many U.S. citizens.
CONCLUSION

Precisely because we already use bond-like mechanisms to
screen rich and highly-skilled migrants by requiring them to pay
attorneys and make minimum investments in the United States, the
onus is on us to explain why we would forgo similar opportunities with
respect to poor migrants. The bonding proposal made herein may
expose the subterfuges that necessarily accompany the tragic choices
that we make in immigration, the burdens of which disproportionately
fall on the poor. This proposal accomplishes significant goals in
immigration to reduce subterfuges and render the choices made
somewhat less tragic, particularly for the poor.
Visa-as-collateral embodies the classic challenges of proposals
that seek to meet liberalism's commitment to improve the lot of the
least
advantaged,
while simultaneously
meeting important
consequentialist goals. Aspects of the proposal may seem unattractive
176. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (2006).
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to those with liberal commitments who are skeptical of initiatives
which appear to increase burdens on aliens, particularly those at the
bottom of the pyramid. Yet, as a practical matter, by reducing the
likelihood and cost of visa breaches, this proposal improves the
likelihood of access for those at the bottom of the pyramid. If the
world's poorest have improved access to credit and to U.S. labor
markets, there are clear positive economic implications, not only for
migrants, but also for source-labor communities and countries. Thus,
to the extent that there is a trade-off between ethical commitments
and consequentialist goals, the trade-off is a worthy one.

Optimal Lead Plaintiffs
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
64 Vand. L. Rev. 1109 (2011)
Adequate representation in securities class actions is, at best,
an afterthought and, at worst, usurped and subsumed by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act's lead-plaintiff appointment
process. Once appointed, the lead plaintiff bears a crushing burden:
Congress expects her to monitor the attorney, thwart strike suits,
and deter fraud, while judges expect her appointment as the "most
adequate plaintiff" to resolve intraclass conflicts and adequaterepresentationproblems. But even if she could be all things to all
people, the lead plaintiff has little authority to do much aside from
appointing lead counsel. Plus, class members in securities-fraud
cases have diverse preferences-their litigation stakes, risk
preferences,
relationships with
class
counsel,
financial
sophistication, and desired remedies all vary. Yet, the presumption
is that because class members are absent, a lead plaintiff with
claims and motivations similar to theirs will advance their interests
and ensure due process. But a single institution or investor pursuing
its or her own interests is hard pressed to represent a diverse class,
much less to fulfill Congressionaland judicial expectations.
In practice if not in print, courts define "interests"in terms of
a widely shared desire to recover one's losses. This broad definition
allows judges to certify securities class actions and thus promote
private enforcement's public function by holding the government and
corporations accountable. But it also means that attorneys can
pursue an institutional lead plaintiff's interests at the other class
members' expense. The "other class members" are principally
individual investors, those who need the class-action vehicle the
most. The logical solution is to appoint a lead-plaintiffgroup. But so
far, groups have underperformed largely because courts prefer
members with preexisting relationships and group cohesion-the
same qualities that lead to group polarization and confirmation
bias. Consequently, this Article suggests an alternative remedy:
appoint a cognitively diverse lead-plaintiff group with individuals
and institutions and link diversity to class members' heterogeneous
interests. Once a richly representative group exists, it should have
more decisionmaking autonomy; lead counsel should consult and
defer to the group's decisions on matters that implicate plaintiffs'

values and litigation objectives or affect the case's merits just as
attorneys do in individual litigation.

